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Abstract 
The high rate of grid computing adoption, both in academe and industry, has posed 
challenges regarding efficient access control, interoperability and scalability. Although 
several methods have been proposed to address these grid computing challenges, none 
has proven to be completely efficient and dependable. To tackle these challenges, a novel 
access control architecture framework, a triple-domain grid-based environment, modelled 
on role based access control, was developed. The architecture’s framework assumes three 
domains, each domain with an independent Local Security Monitoring Unit and a Central 
Security Monitoring Unit that monitors security for the entire grid.  
The architecture was evaluated and implemented using the G3S, grid security services 
simulator, meta-query language as “cross-domain” queries and Java Runtime 
Environment 1.7.0.5 for implementing the workflows that define the model’s task. The 
simulation results show that the developed architecture is reliable and efficient if 
measured against the observed parameters and entities. This proposed framework for 
access control also proved to be interoperable and scalable within the parameters tested.  
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GLOSSARY 
Architecture. This is a structural representation and design framework of how a model 
works. Architecture in this context implies corresponding flow of information with regards 
to the way model explicitly spells it out. 
Access control list (ACL). This is a model which contains a comprehensive list of 
permission attached to an object. It clearly specifies which system or user processes is 
permitted access to various objects with the corresponding operations that are allowed on 
the objects. 
Certification authority (CA).  This is a body that provides digital certificates. A digital 
certificate confirms the ownership of a public key using the named subject of the certificate 
to allow others believe and rely on the signatures made by the private key which tallies with 
the public key that is certified. 
Community authorization service (CAS). This is used when the domains involved, have 
various capabilities for policy enforcement. In this case, CAS finds a solution to the 
problem by delegating some authority while taking total control over the provider’s 
resources (Pearrlman, Kesselman, Welch, Foster, & Tuecke, 2003). It is a security policy in 
grids which provides dynamic and scalable mechanisms for authorization in order to 
monitor and ensure absolute controlled participation of users to distributed resources. It 
enforces fine-grained access monitoring (Sahai, Graupner, Machiraju, & Moorsel, 
2003)procedures in any virtual organization ( Lin, Kang Neo, Liang, Guangbin, & Gray, 
2007). The CAS server is used by a user accessing community resources which provides 
rights to the user with respect to the request as well as the role of the user in the community 
(Pearlman, Welch, Foster, Kesselman, & Tuecke, 2010). 
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Community security policy (CSP). A security measure formulated to guide against the 
misuse of a computer. It curbs offences ranging from revealing confidential information, 
accessing inappropriate sites and sending and receiving suspicious and criminal mails. 
Computational grid. A computational Grid is a form of grids system which allows the 
connection or the network of various hardware and software resources from various 
organizations with a mean to providing sharable resources across a multiple administrative 
domain and to cater for the users need in a reliable and secure manner. In this type of grid 
system, resources are usually aggregated (Machiraju, Sahai, & Moorsel, 2003) in order to act 
as a unified processing resource. 
Context-based access control (CBAC). This is a security mechanism which can be 
configured to allow specified UDP and TCP traffic through a firewall whenever a 
connection is established for any network requesting protection. 
Description logic (DL). It can be used to model concepts, roles and individuals, as well as 
their relationships. It belongs to the family of formal knowledge representation languages 
and it is characterized by more expressive power than propositional logic (Franz, Ian, & 
Ulrike, 2007). 
Distributed computing environment (DCE). DCE is a software system developed to 
supply a framework and toolkit for developing client/server applications. DCE provides a 
dynamic, flexible and scalable distributed environment that resolves complex heterogeneous 
and network environment problems. 
Discretionary access control (DAC). This is a type of access control security model 
designed for restricting access to various objects based on the identity of subjects or groups 
which they belong. With this model, a subject with certain access privilege can pass such 
privilege or permission to any subject. 
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First order logic (FOL). It is used in Computer Science, Mathematics and Philosophy by 
scientists and engineers for modeling. In some cases, FOL is given various names such as 
first-order predicate calculus, the lower predicate calculus, quantification theory, and 
predicate logic (Franz, Ian, & Ulrike, 2007). 
Grid security infrastructure (GSI). This is otherwise known as the Globus Security 
Infrastructure. It is used for specifying secret and a proxy-based communication between 
software in a grid based computing environment. The GSI adopts public key cryptography 
as the background for its functionality. 
Grid security services simulator (G3S). This is a simulation tool developed for designing 
and analyzing grid security solutions. 
Graphical user interface (GUI). This is type of user interface that permits users to relate 
and interact with electronic devices with images instead of text commands. 
Host identity protocol (HIP). This is a technology which provides a mean of separating 
the locator roles of internet protocol (IP) addresses and end-point identifier. It provides a 
new Host Identity (HI) that depends solely on public keys where end-point identifiers are 
derived. 
International telecommunication union (ITU). This is an agency in the United Nations 
saddles with various responsibilities in information and communication technologies such 
as maintaining and developing standards and definitions, coordinating and improving 
statistical ICT measurements on a global level and improving telecommunication 
infrastructures in developing countries of the world. 
Mandatory access control (MAC).This is enforced by the operating system or security 
kernel. Security labels or classifications are assigned to system resources which enable access 
to processes, devices and people with different levels of authorization. 
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Middleware. These are open source softwares that provide access for a grid user to 
effortlessly share, distribute, and aggregate the computing resources on a grid system across 
multiple administrative domains. Without middlewares, sharing and distribution of 
resources cannot take place on the grid system. Some of the examples of grid middlewares 
are PUNCH, GLOBUS, OGSA-DAI, Alchemi, Legion and gLite (Gridbus, 2009). 
Multiple levels of security (MLS). This is a model which permits a computer system to 
process information at various levels of sensitivities. It allows simultaneous access by 
different users with different level of security clearance and prevent users from accessing 
information which they do lack authorisation. 
Northwest Indiana computational grid (NWICG).This is a partnership which 
comprises of different scholars, researchers at various universities in the United States. They 
established a cyber-infrastructure that provides solutions to various complex scientific 
problems (Purdue, 2011). 
Peer-to-peer (P2P). Peer-to-peer can be referred to as a communication structure where 
each computer (node) involved has equal abilities and capabilities and any computer (node) 
can establish a communication process.  In most cases, peer-to-peer communications is 
established by providing client-server capabilities with all the nodes connected together 
(Verma, 2004 ). 
Personal digital assistant (PDA). It is any handheld device or equipment which 
comprises of telephone, computing, fax, networking features and the internet. PDA can 
carry out the function as a fax sender and receiver, mobile phone personal organiser and 
web browser. 
Public key infrastructure (PKI). It can be defined as a combination of software, 
hardware, policies as well as procedures required to control, create, administer, supervise, 
store and withdraw digital certificates. In security, a PKI binds public keys with each user 
identities with the aid of a certificate authority (Price, 2003). 
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Rivest, Shamir and Adelman (RSA). A popular public-key encryption algorithm. 
Role-based access control (RBAC). In computer science security, RBAC is a security 
model for allowing access to genuine and authorized users alone. With RBAC, security 
procedures are greatly and perfectly organized and simplified by making use of roles, 
hierarchies, and constraints to organize privileges ( Zhao & Chadwick, 2008).  
Security model (SM). This is a statement that states the requirements are crucial to 
adequately support and implement a certain security policy.  
Sensitive information (SI). This is information that should be accessed, viewed and 
updated only by the authorized user. It is considered to be sensitive because it is not meant 
for the general public but rather for a specified class of users who have authority to do so. If 
an unauthorized person can access the information it renders the information’s sensitivity 
and confidentiality worthless and useless. 
Simple public key infrastructure (SPKI). It was developed only to overcome the 
problems that emanates from the over complication and scalability of traditional X.509 
public key infrastructure. SPKI is a framework to support security for a wide range of 
internet applications. 
Soft system methodology (SSM). It was conceived by Peter Checkland of Lancaster 
University as a problem solving approach to system development (Checkland, 2000). This 
methodology is suitable for research problems with no obvious or clearly defined solution 
reference and is thus appropriate for this research. 
Trusted third party (TTP). In cryptography, a trusted third party (TTP) could be regarded 
to as an entity that easily facilitates mutual interactions between two parties. The two parties 
involved make use of trust reposed in TTP to secure their interactions and communications. 
Web content management system (WCMS). It is a software system which allows 
creation and management of websites with relative ease. 
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C h a p t e r  1  
STATEMENT AND ANALYSIS OF THE PROBLEM 
SKETCHING THE BACKGROUND 
In this chapter, the background information of the study is provided to contextualize the 
research process. The chapter is divided into seven main sections. The first section provides 
the definition of a grid in the context of this study, while the second section explores the 
rationale for securing a grid. In the third section, an explanation of the challenges being 
addressed is provided and the motivation for addressing those challenges is provided in 
section four. In the fifth section, the research problem is stated and unpacked into two 
research questions. In the seventh section, the outline of the thesis is given. 
Definition of a grid  
The concept of a grid system is analogous to a water grid system. The facilities of a water 
grid system make it possible for individuals and groups to open a tap and collect water 
without knowing or understanding exactly where and how such water is being processed 
(Buyya, 2002). Grid computing provides endless and ubiquitous access to expensive but 
high-quality computing resources to users wherever they find themselves and without them 
having to know exactly where the data is being processed. 
It was in the late 1980s and early 1990s that researchers across the world began to explore 
various types of distributed resources on the Internet. Some of these researchers gathered 
and optimized thousands of workstations for various parallel applications such as graphics 
rendering, simulation and molecular design. Others teamed up to connect various 
supercomputers into a virtual metacomputer over a wide-area network (Gentzsch, 2000) in 
order to understand the actual benefits of a distributed environment and to enhance and 
develop it further.  
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The term “grid computing” was coined by the duo of Ian Foster and Carl Kesselman 
(Foster & Kesselman, 1997), who organized a workshop entitled “Building a Computational 
Grid” (NHSE, 2009) at Argonne National Laboratory, The purpose of the workshop was 
to address challenges which were related to distributed computing and its applications. 
Since the introduction of the term “grid computing” there have been many definitions of it. 
One of the definitions includes Buyya (2002), who defined a grid as follows: 
The "grid is a type of parallel and distributed system that enables the sharing, selection, and 
aggregation of resources distributed across multiple administrative domains based on their (resources) 
availability, capability, performance, cost, and users' quality-of-service requirements.” (Buyya, 2002, 
p. 35). 
The South African Grid (SAGrid) is a typical example of a functional grid where a 
conglomerate of tertiary institutions (universities, laboratories and the Meraka Institute) are 
collaborating in the sharing of resources (Grid, 2010). The five universities that are currently 
on the SAGrid are the University of Cape Town, University of Pretoria, University of the 
Free State, University of Johannesburg and University of the Witwatersrand (GStat, 2010).  
Why secure the grid? 
The need for preventing sensitive and important information from being copied, altered, 
divulged to unauthorized users or manipulated has brought about the need for security on a 
grid system ( Hwang & Yang, 2010).  
Over the years, there have been an increasing number of applications, data and information 
on grids. According to Mohteshim (2005), this has in turn increased the need for greater 
dependability and efficiency of the grid environment. Dependability and efficiency imply 
security. Without security a grid cannot be considered to be dependable. However, security 
models on the grid are difficult to implement and sustain, due to the complexity of the grid 
environment. Traditional access-based control models are based on recognized inadequacies 
( Sandhu, Coyne, Feinstein, & Youman, 1996) and there is thus a need to replace them with 
more flexible models which are relevant to distributed environments. 
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Security challenges to grid computing 
As in a many environments, grid computing continues to encounter security challenges. In 
order to address the security challenges within the grid-based environment, the need for 
understanding is critical. Some of the security challenges include authentication, 
manageability, coordination, interoperability, scalability, and efficient access control.  
The present study focused on three main challenges, i.e. interoperability, scalability, and 
efficient access control. This is primarily because they are considered fundamental, 
prevalent and significant to the effective utilization of grid computing (Bouwman, Mauw, 
Eindhoven, & Petkovic, 2008). Most importantly, previous studies have not addressed the 
three issues (components of the security challenges facing grid computing) simultaneously 
and more so, a survey of literature reveals a lack of attention to these three basic challenges.  
It was first necessary to understand the security challenges in order to achieve the objectives 
of the study. In an attempt to understand each of the security challenges they are explained 
in more detail below. 
Scalability 
Scalability is the ability of a grid system to act efficiently, sufficiently and adequately in 
handling both a small and large number of nodes. This includes the processing capacity 
configuration in order to achieve a secured multi-organisation resource-sharing 
environment (Detsch, Gaspary, Barcellos, & Cavalheiro, 2004). 
The major challenge of grid computing lies in the flexibility to scale up the number of users 
and resources from different domains (Rahmeh & Johnson, 2008). The essence of 
scalability is to purposely cater for future expansion (Ramaswamy, Liu, & Iyengar, 2007). It 
becomes a security challenge when access control is a bottleneck in the grid infrastructure 
and cannot scale, especially when the number of grid domains and users increases. For a 
grid environment to be scalable, therefore, there is need for a centralized administration 
system as well as regular updates of related security policies (Al-Bayatt, Zedan, & Siewe, 
2009). 
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Interoperability 
The interoperability component provides the ability of various systems to operate within the 
grid. This is in order for them to exchange, share and utilize information across different 
platforms ( Abbes, Barbera, Jemn, & Mazigh, 2008). Interoperability is considered a major 
security challenge due to factors such as disparate and unequal security policies, as well as 
the incompatibility of access requirements from different environments (Shen, Yang, Tian, 
& Liu, 2006). 
Diversity in the various security policies poses a challenge to attempts to access various 
domains (Shafiq, Joshi, Bertino, & Ghafoor, 2005). According to Goyal(2011), the 
characteristics of an interoperable grid-based environment include: 
 the presence of a central authority for security and trust; 
 heterogeneous resources, service discovery and management; and 
 the interdependence of security infrastructures. 
Efficient access control:  
Efficient access control (EAC) is intended to enforce control over who can interact with 
resources on the grid network. EAC can be achieved through different means such as 
authentication and authorisation with the aid of an appropriate access control model.  
EAC remains a challenge in grid computing mainly because a very large number of users are 
involved. The users are often considered to be dynamic in their requests (Snelling, Berghe, 
& Li, 2004). This could be attributed to the fact that each domain on the grid has its own 
policies and the various domains are autonomous (Lang, Foster, Siebenlist, 
Ananthakrishnan, & Freeman, 1990).  
To achieve EAC, regulation is required. To regulate and find solutions to the factors that 
impact the EAC within the grid platform, a role-based access control model is proposed. 
This model has role assignment, role authorization and domain hierarchy as three primary 
rules. 
 
 
 
 
Statement and analysis of the problem  5 
 
 
Based on the focus of the study as presented above, the motivation for the study is 
discussed in the next section. 
RESEARCH FRAMEWORK 
Research question 
To investigate the challenges posed by scalability, interoperability and efficient access 
control of a grid, the following research question was articulated:  
How should information on a grid be secured without compromising the accessibility and 
availability of resources?  
The research question was further divided into two sub-questions as follows:  
• How should interoperability and scalability be put in place to ensure the optimal 
utilization of grid computing? 
• How should efficient access control be administered for the entities on the grid in 
order to monitor and control permission to access various resources?  
Objectives of the research 
The objectives of the research study were two-fold:  
(i) To investigate various models relating to scalability, interoperability and access 
control on grid computing systems, i.e. how they are implemented, their mode 
of operations, and their strengths and weaknesses. 
(ii) Based on the findings from the investigation, to develop architectural models. 
The models are aimed at providing scalable, interoperable and efficient access 
control on the grid.  
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Research approach 
In order to achieve the objectives of the research, the following approaches were adopted: 
Objectivism was the epistemological stance of the research and positivism was the 
theoretical perspective. The methodology that was used to manage the research was Soft 
Systems Methodology (SSM) and the methods that were adopted were: 
a) Content analysis: analysis of related literature; 
b) Architecture design,  based on the dynamic role-based access control  
(RBAC) model;  
c) Using simulation and coding to measure the performance of the architecture 
model; and  
d) Quantitative analysis of the simulation findings.  
Motivation 
Scalability, interoperability and efficient access control have been identified as the greatest 
challenges facing grid computing, since sensitive, classified, expensive, confidential and 
valuable resources are shared between various organizations ( Lu, Cao, Chai, & Liang, 
2008). Other challenges for grid computing are management, scheduling, coordination and 
resource sharing (Foster, Yong, Raicu, & Lu, 2008). The former challenges remain greatest 
obstacles towards actualizing the dream of exploiting the full benefit of a grid. A grid-based 
environment that is not scalable constrains and limits the number of entities (resources and 
users) on the grid while a non-interoperable grid-based environment reduces the level of 
application from platform to platform. Finally, a grid with a poor access control framework 
poses a great security challenge, since information should be accessed only by authorized 
subjects hence the need for appropriate access control mechanism to achieve this ( Sandhu, 
Coyne, Feinstein, & Youman, 1996).  
To overcome the problem of scalability, interoperability and poor access control, a triple-
domain grid-based environment (3DGBE) architectural framework was developed based on 
a flexible role-based access control (RBAC). 
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Some of the traditional access control mechanisms currently being adopted in grid 
computing such as discretionary access control (DAC), mandatory access control (MAC), 
access control list (ACL), capability-based access control (CBAC) and multi-level security 
(MLS) are identity based, which makes them neither interoperable nor scalable and thus 
they cannot accommodate the increasing number of users or allow a range of policies on 
their platform ( Hu, Ferraiolo, & Kuhn, 2006).  
Why a triple domain? 
The choice of a 3DGBE is basically to create and establish competition among the entities 
(users and resources) available on the grid. A 3DGBE which is designed with the local 
security monitoring unit (LSMU) from each of the domains, interacts directly with the 
central security monitoring unit (CSMU) of the architecture with the intention of sharing 
and requesting resources. The LSMU gives authorization at local level to any user willing to 
access resources. The CSMU, on the other hand, receives messages from the LSMU 
indicating authorisation to a grid user locally. 
THESIS OUTLINE  
In Chapter 2, the literature related to this study is reviewed. Various categories of grid 
system and grid classification (based on its topology) are discussed, as well as the various 
security policies in a grid-based environment. Furthermore, various categories of security 
attacks are analysed and the chapter concludes with a detailed overview of grid middleware.  
A comprehensive overview of the research design and methodology is presented in Chapter 
3. An overview of the prototype used in the research effort as well as the algorithm that 
underpins it is discussed. The Grid Security Services Simulator (G3S) that was used for 
evaluating the performance of the architecture and algorithm is discussed. 
In Chapter 4, the architectural models and algorithm are presented along with results 
obtained , followed by a discussion around the architectures presented in Chapter 5. Finally, 
in Chapter 6, conclusions are drawn and recommendations made for future work. 
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C h a p t e r  2  
LITERATURE REVIEW 
INTRODUCTION 
In the previous chapter, the problem was stated and the research background was sketched. 
The chapter was concluded by stating the objectives of the research and presenting the 
research approach.  
This chapter presents a review of literature related to the study. The focus is on the 
application of grid computing and the research work that addresses issues related to access 
control, interoperability and scalability on the grid. The chapter is divided into two sections. 
The first covers the review of literature based on the research questions posed in Chapter 1, 
and thereafter addresses scalability, interoperability and access control, while the second 
presents a review of the key concepts in this field of study.  
RESEARCH QUESTIONS UNPACKED 
 How should interoperability and scalability be put in place to ensure the optimal 
utilization of grid computing? 
A. Interoperability: 
The research of Tari and Fry(2001), considered interoperability as an important metric in 
terms of the accessibility of information. They adopted policy aggregation to realize an 
interoperable grid-based environment.  
By definition, security policy aggregation is a process of bringing various security policies 
together from various domains in order to achieve a conflict-free resource-sharing virtual 
environment (see Figure 1).  
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Figure 1: Multi-domain policy interaction in a grid-based environment (Haidar, 2002) 
In Figure 1, Company A uses policy A on a UNIX platform, University B uses policy B on 
a Kerberos platform, Laboratory C uses policy C on the PKI platform, and Company D 
uses policy D on the OS2 platform. The “global policy” is an overarching policy for all 
domains on the grid. Security policy aggregation is when various local security policies are 
reconciled with global policies in order to access grid infrastructure. This is essential in order 
to resolve conflict between global (Lupu & Sloman, 1999) and local policies (Haidar, 2002). 
To ensure interoperability across different domains, Tari and Fry, (2001) proposed global 
access control (GAC) to enforce an aggregated security policy. They used a distributed 
object kernel security service to enforce and aggregate local and general security policies on 
the grid. In order to allow the control of data aggregation, they provided the security 
framework; federated logic language (FELL) and a logic-based language. The security 
constraint was enforced in their model by mapping state transition graphs (which models 
different nodes) on the grid. This approach is effective and enforces various security 
measures, but it is not scalable, since it does not allow more nodes to be added to the 
existing grid.  
Kumari et al. (2010) proposed a collaborative trust enhanced trust security model for an 
interoperable grid environment. They made use of client node and node registry to ensure 
security when a client demands certain services. However, the implementation of their work 
revealed its weaknesses in terms of access control and scalability, as it was difficult to alter 
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the system in order to accommodate an increasing number of users, computing entities and 
resources. Also, the proposed model did not provide secure communication among the grid 
users (Kumari, Shakti Mishra, & Kushwaha, 2010). 
In combating the challenge of interoperability in a grid based environments, Wang et al. 
(2006), developed a modular information provider (MIP) to technically combine diverse 
sources of grid information services. An MIP requires minimal human intervention for 
aggregating a large pool of information services ( Wang, Shook, Padmanabhan, Briggs, & 
Pearlman, 2006) and adopts a modular approach to ensure interoperability. An MIP uses 
the XML version of GLUE Schema 1.2 and Globus MDS4 for implementation. The 
modular pattern of MIP is designed to simplify the management and maintenance of grid 
information by automatically and repeatedly aggregating information sources. However, this 
framework has limitations in terms of its application on various operating systems. The 
middleware that can be used is limited only to Globus, which does not extend MIP to 
capture a MIP-level aggregator to supply information for the whole site. 
The need for interoperability for a complex collaborative multi-disciplinary design product 
has led to the introduction of a semantic grid, which is a combination of grid technology 
and a semantic web in the work of ZeFeng et al. (2010). The introduction of a hierarchical 
model in a semantic grid leads to digital system interoperability that is based on a semantic 
grid ( ZeFeng, HaiCheng, & Rong, 2010). This work is novel in its entirety, but the 
implementation provided does not prove beyond doubt how a semantic grid can achieve 
interoperability among digitizing systems. 
Having noticed the non-interoperable nature of many existing monitoring systems due to 
lack of consistency, a generic monitoring framework was proposed by Shen et al. (2006) to 
address interoperability in a grid-based environment. They designed a consistent data 
provider that was designed on a GMA producer to achieve uniform information 
representation across a grid platform. They developed republisher and monitoring service 
agent to ensure information sharing and aggregation ( Shen, Yan, Qiang, Wu, & Zhang, 
2006). Implementation was carried out using Ganglia, PBS and GridView. The approach 
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adopted in this regard is not suitable for a scalable and flexible grid environment, however, 
because a pacified number of entities are required. 
The challenge arises from lack of interoperability of various grid across the globe was 
addressed in the work of Abbes et al. (2008). They proposed a super worker node-based 
architecture which aggregates several services of a gLite-WN and an lcg-CE ( Abbes, 
Barbera, Jemn, & Mazigh, 2008) with service that manipulates the gLite job to a XtremWeb-
CH job. The relevance of this work has not been empirically verified to ascertain its 
effectiveness. 
The use of public key infrastructures (PKIs) to provide maximum flexibility and 
interoperability in order to permit grid resource use manages to securely provide access to 
various systems across the multiple administrative domains. In this approach, various 
services are added as PKIs grow to enhance interoperability and security. Applications and 
users must strive to confirm the availability of resources especially when the certification 
authority (CA) is unfamiliar to the reliant party (Pala, Cholia, Rea, & Smith, 2008). The work 
is able to achieve interoperability through the integration of both grid security infrastructure 
with PKI resource query protocol (PRQP). 
Di et al. (2006) proposed a novel approach for connecting various heterogeneous grid 
platforms to achieve interoperability. They solved the problem of interoperability using the 
concept of ontology. They focused on solving the problem of the semantic inconsistency of 
different grid platforms and by developing a unique ontology. The ontology is transacted 
with adapted and depicted by a resource description framework (RDF). The algorithm 
developed was programmed into an adapter that gives faces for platforms’ administrators. 
The approach was tested on two grid platforms ( Di, Jin, Li, Chen, Qi, & Wang, 2007). The 
approach, although effective, does not give room for flexibility in terms of resources and a 
platform for optimising the design and algorithms.  
Ensuring interoperability through the application of information-flow theory and adopting 
it to enhance information interoperability in the distributed system, specifically on the grid, 
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was researched by Weihua and Shixian (2005). The work presents an agent-based 
information interoperability framework with the layered model. It achieved automatic 
information interoperability through the aggregation of ontology and agent technology. The 
weakness of this work lies in its inability to take into account a model for advanced network 
application. 
VCF components established on ESA’s current Excel-based concurrent design facility was 
developed by Watkins, Mark, Leonard, and Surridge (2007) in order to demonstrate the 
integration and interoperability of grid computing in distributed design. They achieved this 
by creating a STEP-compliant database that stores and validates design parameters. The 
database was designed in such a way as to reveal a GRIA 5.1 grid service, while a 
.NET/WSE3.0 was established to ensure parameter parsing between the STEP database 
and the Excel client. The policy updates were able to achieve high level of interoperability 
between various entities on the platform. However, to enhance the performance of the 
framework, additional WS-Trust token services would be required at various domain sites ( 
Luo, Ni, & Yong, 2009). 
B.   Scalability 
Having noted the challenge of scalability in a collaborative virtual environment (CVE) due 
to limitated network technologies and computing resources, Zhang  et al. (2007) developed 
a hybrid (combined) communication model based on open grid services architecture 
(OGSA). Consequently, a scalable CVE architectural framework established on OGSA was 
developed. This was achieved by using a virtual world management service (VWMS) to 
ensure and implement scalable CVE ( Zhang, Wu, & Wu, 2007). They implemented the 
framework on a GT5.0 to validate the effectiveness of the architecture. However, the 
architecture has limited application as it is applicable to virtual campus systems only 
(Grimshaw, 2008). 
A scalable authorisation was developed by Wang, Zheng, and Song (2005) in order to 
achieve scalable grid-based environment. An authorisation framework that was established 
on a distributed authentication servers, as well as an extension to the information service of 
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a grid-based system. Scalability is achieved in this framework by developing local 
authentication servers and incorporating it into the information service, which ensures that 
various services are enabled at the grid system level and local host level. The flexible nature 
of the grid system was addressed by adopting an RBAC security model that binds grid users 
to various assigned roles rather than binding to the resources. 
In an attempt to ensure scalability for scientific applications on grid computing with a 
service-oriented architecture, Sanjeepan et. al, (2005) developed a framework that provides a 
uniform abstraction for a category of applications and ensures a generic application service 
to envelop and wrap these applications as services. The novel contribution of this approach 
lies in the automatic nature of the entire process, which is carried out without the need to 
request grid system downtime or coding. This approach represents a very useful technique 
for building grid portals through which a great number of applications can be dynamically 
established. However, this framework could not implement complex simulation process 
that involves multiple applications that can be managed with constant user interaction by 
giving a dependable workflow specification and aligning it with a workflow engine. 
Gor et al. (2005) achieved scalability by unified grid management and data architecture 
(UGanDA). The framework consists of two main components, GridWorm and MAGI, 
which are the grid workflow manager and grid infrastructure manager, respectively (Gor, et 
al., 2005). 
While GridWorm allows the workflow to be specified and managed with an intuitive 
interface, MAGI reduces the task of job submission and diligently executes jobs over a grid 
infrastructure. The synergy between the components allows the users to specify high level 
requirements along the workflow system, which subsequently uses MAGI’s management 
services to manage the infrastructure (Gor, et al., 2005). The proposed framework sounds 
interesting, but its application does not expand to developing the data management 
capabilities across a large grid network.  
The challenge of scalability was also addressed in the research carried out by Li (2005). He 
developed an authorisation framework based on grid authorisation servers. The objective of 
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his framework was to address and overcome various challenges discovered in existing 
authorisation architectural designs by providing a scalable authorisation and authentication 
approach that could meet the requirement of a flexible grid based environment. With this 
approach, scalability was achieved with the use of distributed servers. The flexible nature of 
a grid system was handled using RBAC, while authorisation was conveniently adjusted and 
manipulated as changes arise in the grid system environment (Li , 2005). The results 
obtained from the experiment were not convincing enough to confirm the efficiency of the 
proposed framework. 
How should efficient access control be administered for the entities on the grid in 
order to monitor and control permission to various resources?  
C.   Access control 
Access control in grids involves appraising each request submitted by a virtual 
organization’s entity to access any desired resources in the grid, in a bid to determine if the 
request by the grid user should be denied or permitted, based on the policy available for 
accessing resources in the virtual organisation (VO). In summary, controlling access to 
resources on the grid requires three important phases: authentication of the initiator, an 
authorization decision for the submitted request and enforcement of the request (Laccetti & 
Schmid, 2007 ). 
Access control permits an authority to monitor access to resources in any computer-based 
information system or physical facility to protect important, classified, confidential or 
sensitive information or resources ( Hu, Ferraiolo, & Kuhn, 2006). Access in this model can 
either be allowed or denied, depending on the authentication methods. Access control could 
also be interpreted to mean a process of exercising absolute control over who should use or 
access a particular resource (Bouwman, Mauw, Eindhoven, & Petkovic, 2008). 
In the work of He et al. (2008), a model was developed for the grid based on a public key 
and double identity authentication to ensure access control among various entities. The 
model based on the RSA cryptosystem of Euler’s theorem ensured both authenticity and 
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confidentiality (Dallon  et al., 2007). The double identity authentication approach included a 
“time parameter” on the server side using both the server and a client-produced password 
that changes over time (He, Li, & Hu, 2008). This model was not scalable and dynamic, as 
provision was not made for the expansion of users.  
Attribute based access control (ABAC) systems, such as Akenti and PERMIS (Lang, Foster, 
Siebenlist, Ananthakrishnan, & Freeman, 1990) have been in use on several grid 
applications some time. These authorization systems allow only their own rules and 
therefore do not allow other rules and policies. Dynamic ABAC would be preferred for a 
dynamic grid computing environment, which is not the case in this ABAC model, where 
there is no provision made for interoperability across various domains on the grid.  
McLean came up with a framework using mandatory access control (MAC) with an 
architecture that allow for changes in security. He employed algebra to construct his model, 
which paved the way for discretionary access control for N-persons (McLean, 2008). This 
model, however, did not provide for the separation of duties as an ingredient for a secure 
grid environment. 
In order to ensure efficient access control in distributed environment, architecture for 
securing authorship was developed by Ferreira, Berstis, Armstrong, Kendzierski, 
Neukoetter and Takagi (2003). An architecture to ensure temporal and authorship 
protection of information was developed which can be used to resolve conflicting claims on 
intellectual property. These authors applied PKI techniques to institute access control and 
reliability on a grid. To ensure a reliable environment, a trusted entity using a certificate 
authority (CA) provides a digital certificate to some entities, which provides information 
about the key owner and public key. The model uses an encryption on a private key to 
perform a digital signature.  
The challenge of this model is that it is not scalable, as it has limited application and it also 
reduces the number of users. Also, it does not permit flexibility among the grid users if 
conflicting roles are granted among various users. 
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When researching access control, Laccetti. and Schmid (2007) came up with a framework 
for reliable security that ensured accessibility to resources on the grid based on grid security 
infrastructures (GSI) and community security policy (CSP) which captured the policies and 
rules of the grid. A trust relationship, based on a cryptographic key (Menezes, Vanstone, & 
Van Oorschot, 1997), was used as the guiding principle for this framework. It was found 
that authentication (implemented at grid levels) develops a trust relationship that is transitive 
(which is not the case when authentication is used) (Laccetti & Schmid, 2007 ). This model 
was characterized by a lack of flexibility, as it had limited application (Kumari, Shakti 
Mishra, & Kushwaha, 2010) , coupled with the fact that it does not give room for scalability 
, which is addressed in this thesis. 
Architecture based on user identity authorization was developed by Junrang et al. (2004). 
The model allowed a user to get a grid agent and sign a certification to provide inter-domain 
authentication with a user agent. After this, the user sent an identity authorization request to 
Globus Secure Infrastructure (GSI). When a user was authorized, a pair of keys was created 
by GSI, which forward a private key to the user for transferring the public key with the user 
grid ID to the storage agent. At this stage, the user sent a request already signed with the 
received private key to the mass storage agent to subsequently verify it with the public key. 
This model provided a simple method of access control, but it was not reliable when the 
number of domains was increased (Junrang, Zhaohui, Jianhua, & Mingwang, 2004). Also, 
there was no policy aggregation among various domains and hence no flexibility among 
users. 
A novel mechanism to provide access control and reliability to achieve flexibility on a grid 
was developed by Yan Li et al. (2008). The prototype was developed to protect sensitive 
files and data across domains. In the model, operation, object, subject and policy constraint 
defined the entire mechanism. To evaluate the new mechanism, comparison between 
various results was presented with different policies, since the focus was on access control 
and reliability in order to achieve flexibility. Implementation revealed that access control was 
suitable for accessing resources without hindrance. It also revealed that the prototype was 
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reliable. However, the new mechanism was only suitable for a limited grid environment and 
did not allow for interoperability ( Li, Sun, Chen, Ren, & Luo, 2008). 
To further the ability to access resources on a grid system, the SESAME prototype was 
developed by Zhang and Parashar (2006) using a dynamic context-aware access. The model 
complemented a subsisting authorization mechanism to dynamically grant permissions to 
various users based on their context. In this model, each user was assigned a role subset 
from the role universal set. Also, each resource was given a permission subset from a 
universal permission set to each of the roles that had the right to access the resource (Zhang 
& Parashar, 2006 ). 
According to the model developed, if user N wished to log into the system with his/her 
PDA based on his/her credentials, the authorization service assigned the user a set of roles 
and also set up an access control mechanism on the same PDA that regulated and 
maintained the role and state of the machine. Based on the level of the user’s security 
wireless connection, a dynamic RBAC policy was used to select an appropriate role. The 
main concern in the implementation of this model lay in its reliability and policy aggregation 
towards achieving flexibility so as to ensure accessibility to various resources (Hey & 
Trefethen, 2002). It was, however, noted that this model was applicable in an organization 
where the number of roles and permissions is relatively small. Hence, the model was not 
scalable (Foster, Kesselman, & Tuecke, 2001). 
Also addressing this question was Cai, Liu, Guo, Zhang, and Geng (2009) reliable model 
built on a password-key exchange (GPAKE) The model could satisfy various requests 
submitted by different users to the authorized access control system alone. However, it was 
faced with serious attack because the password could be guessed. Also, it provided neither 
room expansibility in any form nor interoperability in a grid-based environment. 
Chen et al. (2006) developed an access control framework which consisted of three basic 
fundamental elements: meta-model, meta-data and a meta-protocol. The meta-model was 
used to map relationship among different entities through level architecture while the meta-
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level allowed the various computing entities to implement the reflection function of the 
system. These entities used the meta-protocol in manipulating and retrieving meta-data in 
the meta-level. The objective of this framework was to manipulate and adjust the system’s 
activities and status based on the relationship between the system’s implementation and the 
user’s action (Chen, Wu, Wang, & Chi, 2006). The weakness of this framework lay in its 
inability to empirically evaluate the framework to affirm and confirm its effectiveness. 
The work of Cirio et al.(2007) showed how semantic web ontologies can be adopted and 
used to establish an efficient access control system. They made use of the RBAC technique 
and improved it with contextual attributes. The methodology allowed for the flexible 
allocation and association of roles among users on the grid ( Cirio, Cruz, & Tamassia, 2007). 
The classification of resources and users, together with access control consistency policies, 
was carried out with the assistance of a Description Logic (DL) reasoner. They achieved this 
by reducing the expressive power of DL formalism using SPARQL queries to cleanse the 
output of the DL reasoner. The weaknesses of this approach lay in the complexity of its 
implementation and limitations in the area of application. 
Jeong et al. (2006) developed an authorisation and authentication architectural framework 
for a grid-based system. In their design, they made use of SAML (Security Assertion 
Markup Language) and XACML (eXtensible Access Control Markup Language) for 
building single sign-on and authorisation (Jeong, Yu, Shin, Shin, Moon, & Lee, 2006). 
Although, the architecture permitted the possibility of establishment and implementation of 
various single sign-on techniques for a secured grid computing environment, the approach 
was static and did not allow variation in policies for the established scenario.  
An enhanced RBAC security model was presented in the work of Aziz et al.(2006) They 
clearly defined a risk approach for the model that expressed various elements of 
combinatorial, operational and conflict of interest risk in a particular scenario. Their model 
consisted of various mechanisms for risk reduction such as stack checking, a firewall and 
redundancy (Aziz, Foley, Herbert , & Swart, 2006). The problem with this framework was 
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its inability to monitor access efficiently when the number of entities on the grid was 
increased (Nithya & Banu, 2010). It also lacked flexibility.  
Geethakumari et al. (2009) proposed an access control architectural framework for the 
implementation and adaptation of RBAC in a grid-based environment. They solved the 
various access control challenges by proposing role equivalence among various domains 
through mapping of the role at the local domain level with its equivalent global role 
(Geethakumari, Atul, & Sastry, 2009). The final authorisation was achieved through the 
mapping of resource access policies with the global role ranking. The challenge in this 
approach lay in its inconsistency in terms of ranking pattern, which consequently resulted in 
static role authorisation. 
A password-based authorisation mechanism was developed by Cai et al. (2009). An access 
control framework with a three-party password key exchange can guarantee user requests to 
the legal and authorised access control. The protocol they developed used existing GPAKE 
to authenticate the identity and subsequently provide access privilege to the applicant ( Cai, 
Liu, Guo, Zhang, & Geng, 2009). This access control could only provide lower security 
level (Humphrey, Thompson, & Jackson, 2005) for the system and the danger of attack by 
hackers guessing the password was very high. 
A framework that made use of risk and trust as the two basic vital parameters for access 
control decision was proposed in the work of Li et al.(2008). The mechanism was intended 
to represent confidence in the peer and to guarantee the safety of users’ information ( Li, 
Sun, Chen, Ren, & Luo, 2008). The work was novel in its entirety, but evaluation models 
were not introduced to truly refine the evaluation of both risk and trust.  Also, the 
assessment of the amount of input and output precision remained a difficult challenge. 
In an attempt to find a solution to the challenge of access control on a grid platform, Chen 
et al.(2008) adopted a fuzzy approach of trust by applying the fuzzy theory of reasoning and 
representation to the multi-domain access control approach (Chen, Luo, & Ni, 2008). The 
case study claimed to achieve effective and efficient access control in a multi-domain grid-
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based environment. However, the two-level fuzzy approach presented was cumbersome 
and ambiguous. The approach was difficult to digest and did not allow the resources to be 
expanded. 
DISCUSSION OF KEY CONCEPTS 
Since all research has associated key concepts around which the study is developed, it is 
necessary to clarify the meaning of such key concepts. In this thesis, the key concepts that 
will be discussed in this section are grid computing, security, computational grid, security 
model, authorization, authentication, prototype and architecture. 
Grid computing  
Grid computing can be regarded as a form of parallel or distributed computing which 
allows the sharing of resources across various organizations. One of the key factors that 
distinguishes grid computing from cluster computing is that a grid system tends to be 
loosely coupled. Aside from this, a computing grid is usually designed to run just a single 
application at a time and it makes use of a grid middleware (Buyya, 2009), which serves as 
intermediary between the resources and the machine. There are basically three prominent 
categorizations of grids, namely: computational grids, data grids and service grids (Alfawair, 
Aldabbas, Bartels, & Zedan, 2007). 
The concept of a grid system is analogous to a water grid system (Chetty & Buyya, 2002). 
The facilities of water grid system make it possible for anyone to open the tap and fetch 
water without knowing exactly where such water is being produced or processed. The 
technology behind computing grid is very similar to this (Jacob & Fukui, 2005). Grid 
computing therefore provides users with endless and ubiquitous access to expensive but 
high quality computing resources to the user wherever they find themselves. The concept of 
grid computing entered the spotlight in the mid-1990s when it was considered as a basic 
system and structure for solving problems in science and engineering. Since then it has also 
been incorporated into the process of finding solutions for both scientific and commercial 
applications (Foster, Kesselman, Carl & 2003). 
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How is grid computing classified? 
General classification 
In terms of their general classification, three main categories of grids can be identified, 
based on their application (Alfawair, Aldabbas, Bartels, & Zedan, 2007). Each classification 
has to do with the solution they offer at a particular point in time. The classifications are as 
follows: computational grids, data grids and service grids. 
Computational grid 
A computational grid (Foster , Kesselman, Tsudik, & Tuecke, 1998) simply means a 
connection or network of various hardware and software resources from various 
organizations with a means to provide sharable resources across a multiple administrative 
domain and to cater for users’ needs in a reliable and secure manner (Rosado, 2009). In this 
type of grid, resources are usually aggregated ( Buyya, Abramson, & Giddy, 2001) in order 
to act as a unified processing resource. A few of the numerous problems that are solved by 
computational grid systems are modeling and simulating complex scientific and engineering 
problems, diagnosing medical conditions, forecasting the weather and many others. The 
Northwest Indiana Computational Grid (NWICG) is a typical example of a computational 
grid (NWICG, 2008). 
Data grid 
As the name implies, the data grid (Foster & Kesselman, 2003) handles and deals with data. 
It allows data to be shared and transferred among various users on the grid. In other word, 
a data grid can be regarded as a basis for sharing, managing and controlling very large 
amounts of data among authorized users distributed across different networks. The need 
for a data grid is pivotal for data distribution in many organizations. The data grid is an 
innovation that has been widely accepted and implemented in academe, industry, research 
institutes and the banking sector. However, significant security challenges are experienced at 
the highest level of opportunity being realized on data grid system; these challenges are 
currently being researched by various researchers in both academia and research institutions. 
The main objective of a data grid is to model the future generation of computing resources 
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that will be able to handle very large-scale database integration (Alfawair, Aldabbas, Bartels, 
& Zedan, 2007). 
Service grid 
There are three categories under this classification: multimedia service grids, on-demand 
service grids and collaborative service grids. A multimedia service grid provides services for 
various real-time multimedia applications such as virtual reality ( Buyya, Abramson, & 
Giddy, 2001), interactive TV and computer games. A collaborative service grid combines 
different infrastructures to provide new services, while an on-demand service grid provides 
real-time collaboration and interaction for resource sharing (Buyya R. , 2003).  
Classification based on topology 
Grid computing can be classified in terms of topology into four main groups, i.e, clusters, 
intra-grids, extra-grids and inter-grid ( Foster , Kesselman, Lee, Lindell, Nahrstedt, & Roy, 
1999). This is depicted in Figure 2. 
Cluster 
This is the smallest form of grid both in scope and size (Alfawair, Aldabbas, Bartels, & 
Zedan, 2007). It involves a combination of various servers to generate high computing 
power in comparison to what is obtainable in an offline (standalone) system. This form of 
grid computing is developed to solve problems in a unit or department and is usually 
implemented in a university campus intranet.  
Intra-grid 
This is a combination of various clusters. This form of grid computing is also known as a 
campus grid. It allows resources to be shared across various departments and units that 
function in terms of the same policies, without any need to address the security and policy 
management issues relating to global grids. 
 
 
 
 
Literature review  23 
 
 
 
 
 
Cluster grid    Intra-grid     Extra-grid         Inter-grid 
Figure 2: Grid classification based on topology 
Extra-grid 
This type of grid is also called a “partner grid” or an “extraprise grids”. It is a combination 
of two or more intra-grid with various security domains. This form of grid is geographically 
distributed among various establishments, companies and organizations. Virtual private 
networks (VPN) are used for implementing this type of grid to make resources easily 
available to users (Alfawair, Aldabbas, Bartels, & Zedan, 2007). 
Inter-grid 
This type of grid is the final phase of grid evolution. It is otherwise known as a global grid. 
It is a combination of both the intra-grids and cluster grids joined together by the Internet. 
This form of grid is popularly used in academia. 
SECURITY OF THE GRID 
Security simply refers to measures put in place to ensure the safety, continuity, reliability, 
confidentiality and integrity of resources on a grid system. It can also be regarded as a 
means of safeguarding information and resources against illegal access, disclosure and 
alteration. Security is a very important concept that has been a serious research area in 
computing because of its effect on all the resources that are shared on a network. 
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Security requirements in a grid environment 
In order to shield the resources on the grid from being attacked and from unlawful 
visitation, reliable privacy, data integrity, data confidentiality, non-repudiation, availability, 
authorization and authentication must be assured and provided ( Lu, Cao, Chai, & Liang, 
2008). 
The security requirements as given in Al-Bayatt, Zedan and Siewe (2009) were defined by 
the International Organization for Standardization (ISO) such as the International 
Telecommunication Union (ITU) e.g. ITU-T Provisions X.805 and X.800. 
Sensitive information 
This is information that should be accessed, viewed and updated by the authorized user 
alone. It is considered to be sensitive simply because it is not meant for public consumption 
and is for the use of a specified user or a group of users who have authority to do so. Any 
attempt to make it vulnerable to an outsider or an unauthorized fellow for manipulation and 
alteration renders the information’s sensitivity and confidentiality worthless. 
Authorization 
For any organization to allow its resources to be jointly shared among all the parties 
involved, there is need for authorization in terms of who should have access to particular 
resources and who should not. It also allows permission for use to be given only to 
authorized nodes on the network (Al-Bayatt, Zedan, & Siewe, 2009). Globus Toolkit 
Gridmap files, the Community Authorization Service (CAS) and Virtual Organization 
Membership Service (VOMS are authorization measures usually adopted in grid computing 
(Chadwick, 2005). 
Authentication and access control 
Impersonation has been identified as a major threat in a grid environment. Authentication is 
important to purposely prevent illegal access to resources ( Lu, Cao, Chai, & Liang, 2008). 
The main purpose of authentication is to confirm that the user is indeed the person whom 
he/she claims to be.  
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In both the shared and personal computer system, authentication is usually carried out with 
the use of a password and username. It has been established that when a password is used 
to log into the system, the authenticity of a user is usually fully guaranteed. However a 
password can be stolen, hence the information on the system can be vulnerable. 
Digital certificates, verified by a certificate authority, are taken as the best way to ensure 
authentication on the Internet ( Lu, Cao, Chai, & Liang, 2008).  
Data confidentiality 
The purpose of data confidentiality is to protect data from being divulged to the wrong or 
an unintended party ( Shen, Yan, Qiang, Wu, & Zhang, 2006). 
Two processes can be used to achieve data confidentiality: data encryption and data 
decryption. Also, two main types of cryptography (Menezes, Vanstone, & Van Oorschot, 
1997) can be used to provide data confidentiality (MSDN, 2005), i.e. symmetric and 
asymmetric cryptography. 
Symmetric cryptography. 
In this type of cryptography, both the sender and the recipient use a common key to carry 
out encryption and decryption. 
 
Figure 3: The process of symmetric encryption 
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As illustrated in Figure 3, symmetric encryption involves the following stages:  
1. The cipher text message is created by the sender through the encryption of a plain 
text message with the assistance of a symmetric encryption algorithm and a shared 
key. 
2. The cipher text message is sent to the recipient by the sender. 
3. The cipher text message is decrypted back into a plaintext by the recipient. 
Asymmetric cryptography 
With asymmetric cryptography, which is also called public key cryptography, different keys 
are used by the sender and recipient for encryption and decryption, respectively ( Cai, Liu, 
Guo, Zhang, & Geng, 2009). The sender encrypts data with one key, and the recipient uses 
a different key to decrypt cipher text (see Figure 4). 
As illustrated in Figure 4, asymmetric encryption involves the following steps:  
1. The cipher text message is created by the sender, who encrypts the plaintext 
message with the aid of an encryption algorithm and the recipient’s public key. 
2. The cipher text message is sent from the sender to the recipient. 
3. The cipher text message is decrypted back to plaintext with the aid of a private key 
that tallies with the public key that was used to encrypt the message. 
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Figure 4: Asymmetric encryption 
Data integrity 
In the banking industry, the military and the aviation industry, data modification by an 
unauthorised person may have serious consequences (Akimana & Markowitch, 2006). With 
data integrity (Gilbert, Abraham, & Paprzycki, 2004), data in a grid environment is 
guaranteed to be removed , updated, modified, deleted, edited and transmitted only by an 
authourised person (Khider, Osman, & Sherkat, 2010). 
Non-repudiation 
Since transactions often take place on the Internet, repudiation prevents the parties involved 
in a transaction from denying that a particular transaction has taken place when it has 
indeed been carried out (Zhou, Deng, & Bao, 1999). 
Non-repudiation therefore ensures that both the receiver and the sender cannot deny that a 
message has been sent or received. This security measure can assist in identifying and 
isolating any node on the grid that has become compromised (Onieva & Zhou, 2008).  
This security measure is usually achieved through the use of digital signatures and 
certificates. Timestamps that contain the date and time can equally be used. Finally, a 
message transfer agent can be used to create and provide a digital receipt to establish that a 
message was sent and received (Anderson, 2008).  
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Privacy 
The main purpose of privacy is to ensure that information being shared on the grid system 
is protected. Every grid user wants his/her sensitive information to be completely secured 
from misuse and abuse ( Kaga & Abelson, 1990). The definition of privacy is as follows:  
"Privacy is the right of individuals to determine for 
themselves when, how, and to what extent information about 
them is communicated to others" (Ashley & Karjoth, 2003) 
Availability of resources  
Despite possible security attacks, data must be readily available across the network to satisfy 
the demand of grid computing users at any point in time (Chon, Enokido, Wietrzsk, & 
Takizawa, 2004). Data availability means that data is available at all times. In a grid 
environment, data availability is usually achieved through redundancy, which has to do with 
how data is stored and how it can be reached. Also, essential and adequate services must be 
made available by a node at any time (Berman, Fox, Hey, & Hey, 2005). 
Authentication 
Authentication simply means the process by which an intended user of a computer system 
is verified thoroughly to confirm if there is a legal backing and allowance for his/her usage 
of or access to the system (Laccetti & Schmid, 2007 ). Some of the approaches that are 
generally adopted for carrying out authentication include a username and password 
(Federico, 2009). They can also include other methods of demonstrating identity such as 
voice recognition and fingerprints (Dewan, Grundin, & Horvitz, 2007). 
Attacks on a grid system 
It has been recognized by researchers that all forms of distributed systems are vulnerable to 
attacks and not completely secured. Some of the security measures used are inflexible and 
not scalable (Laccetti & Schmid, 2007 ). 
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Security attacks on a grid system can be classified as follows: 
 Passive attacks; 
 Active attacks; and 
 Dictionary attacks. 
Passive attacks 
Passive security attacks ranges from secret monitoring of transmissions, such as electronic 
mail messages, file exchange on any distributed system, client-server transmission or 
eavesdropping (Al-Bayatt, Zedan, & Siewe, 2009). Passive attacks involve exposing and 
releasing of message content and a thorough analysis of traffic: 
Exposing and releasing of message contents 
This form of attack is explained in Figure 5. It is obvious that electronic mail message, 
telephone conversations and a file being transferred may contain sensitive and confidential 
information (Stallings, 2002). To guard against the vulnerability of the information, it is 
necessary to prevent someone who is not authorised to do so from learning and 
understanding the contents of the transmission (Welch & Lathrop, 2003). 
Figure 5: Release of message contents (passive attack) 
Traffic analysis  
This is a form of security attack whereby messages are intercepted and examined in order to 
acquire information from patterns in the communication process. This form of attack can 
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be carried out even when the message is encrypted and is difficult to decrypt (Chon, 
Enokido, Wietrzsk, & Takizawa, 2004). As a general principle, the higher the number of 
messages intercepted and examined the more the deduction and inference from the traffic. 
Traffic analysis can be carried out by military intelligence and it is a serious concern in 
computer security (McClure, Scambray, & Kurtz, 2003). Supposing a message is masked 
(encrypted), an adversary might still gain valuable information from the message by 
determining the location and identity of the communicating host and the frequency with 
which messages are exchanged and their length (Khider, Osman, & Sherkat, 2010). It has 
been established that passive attacks are extremely difficult to detect since they do not 
involve the alteration of the data in the messages. 
 
Figure 6: Traffic analysis 
Active attacks 
This type of attack attempts to change, remove, or destroy data being transferred from one 
system to another on a grid network. Some of the types of active attacks are denial of 
service (DoS), masquerade, replay and modification. An active attack can be internal or 
external (Welch & Lathrop, 2003). It can be prevented with the aid of common and popular 
security mechanisms like firewalls and encryption techniques. The section below gives brief 
explanations of some of the examples of active attacks. 
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Denial of service (DoS) 
This type of active security attack halts the system on a grid (IASTED, 2004) so that it fails 
to respond to users’ demand. To accomplish this objective, attackers will send a very large 
quantity of data at the access point (Mohteshim, 2005) so that it makes it extremely difficult 
to respond appropriately. DoS deliberately aims at preventing legitimate grid users from 
accessing the resources on the grid. 
Masquerade or impersonation 
In this case both the attitude and behaviour of an authorized grid user are mimicked and 
copied by the attackers. With this approach, attackers can easily modify and change 
information to the detriment of a legal user. Man-in-the middle attack is the commonest 
form of impersonation. 
Disclosure 
Sensitive information across the grid might be disclosed by a compromised machine on the 
grid to another machine that is not authorized to have access to such information. Also, 
classified information might be divulged by a user that is not recognized to access it, thus 
compromising the secrecy of the information (Al-Bayatt, Zedan, & Siewe, 2009).  
Unauthorized access 
This type of security attack occurs when a person who is permitted to access particular 
information gains access to it and interfere with it in some way as if he were the rightful 
owner of the information. When this happens the sensitivity of the information will be lost 
and it can easily be manipulated without challenge (Imine, Cherif, & Rusinowitch, 2009). 
This may happen through unpatched software or other known vulnerabilities. 
Replay attack  
Replay attack can also be likened to the man-in-the-middle form of attack. This form of 
security attack allows the data packets to be intercepted and replayed (resent) to the server. 
For example, if a client sends an encrypted password and a username to a server to gain 
access to any grid information and a hacker is able to use a monitoring software to intercept 
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such a message and replay/resend it, such a hacker will have the same right of access as the 
rightful owner the message (Jeong, Yu, Shin, Shin, Moon, & Lee, 2006). In fact, the hacker 
may even attempt to alter the password and thereby deny the authorized user access to the 
information. This type of attack can be avoided with the aid of digital signatures. 
Dictionary attack 
This method is used by attackers to break a security measure put in place for a system or a 
server by trying all possible passwords with the intention of gaining access. The attackers 
begin by using the most common way people create a password, e.g. by using their names, 
children’s names, date of birth and place of work. The attack is carried out with the 
assistance of software (Azeez & Osunade, 2009). This form of attack allows words to be 
sorted by usage frequency and begins with the most likely one.  
Dictionary attacks allow spammers to randomly send mail across to various addresses using 
a combination of some popular domain names with the intention of sending information 
across to a large number of e-mail users ( Pinkas & Sander, 2008). For example a dictionary 
attack may begin with the following e-mail addresses john@uwc.ac.za, john1@uwc.ac.za, 
john2@uwc.ac.za, john3@uwc.ac.za. This may continue until all possible combinations of 
both the numbers and variable have been tried. 
Account locking and delayed response are two major countermeasures against dictionary 
attacks. Account locking allows the accounts to be locked completely to the attackers after 
they have made a few unsuccessful efforts to gain access (Houmb., Georg, France, & 
Matheson, 2004). In delayed response, a server gives a slow YES/NO response when a 
login-name/password is supplied. This prevents attackers from rapidly checking a large 
number of passwords ( Pinkas & Sander, 2008). 
Architecture 
This is a structural representation and design framework of how a model works. 
Architecture in this context implies a corresponding flow of information with regard to the 
way the model explicitly spells it out. It varies from one model to another.  
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Prototype 
This is a framework to accurately simulate the characteristic features of a planned design.  
The main reason for having a prototype is to attain an agreement level between the user and 
the designer/developer to ensure whether the design conforms to specifications and, if it 
does not, to make amendment before a final decision is taken on such a design (McLean, 
2008). A certain level of expertise is very crucial to satisfactorily employ prototyping as a 
design checking tool. Prototyping testing can be used to bring down the level of risk and 
hazard a design could generate. 
Computational grid  
A computational grid is a form of grid system that allows the connection of various 
hardware and software resources from various organizations so as to provide sharable 
resources across a multiple administrative domain and to cater for users’ needs in a reliable 
and secure manner (Brown, 1999). In this type of grid system, resources are usually 
aggregated in order to act as a unified processing resource (Machiraju, Sahai, & Moorsel, 
2003). 
Security model 
This can be regarded as a system of stating and implementing security policies. A security 
model (Goguen & Meseguer, 2009) may be based on formal model access rights or a model 
of distributed computing (Geogiev & Georgiev, 2001).This is a statement of the 
requirements crucial to adequately support and implement a certain security policy. If there 
is a security policy that requires authentication and authorization before permitting the 
accessing of information on the network (Buttler, et al., 2000), the security model might 
schedule an access control matrix that should be designed so that it supports and fulfils the 
requirements of the security policy ( Pinkas & Sander, 2008). It might be possible for a 
security policy to state that no one from a lower security level should access or view 
particular information at a higher security level. The security model in this regard will state 
adequate rules and guidelines that are expected to be put in place for this security policy to 
be implemented (Ashley & Karjoth, 2003).  
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Triple-domain grid-based environment  
This is an architectural model designed to cater for resource sharing among three levels of 
domains. Each of the domains is characterised by the local security monitoring unit which is 
responsible for the authorisation and authentication of users and a central security unit that 
allow all users on the grid to be given final authorization in order to have access to 
resources on the network. 
In this dissertation, scalability, interoperability and efficient access control are 
simultaneously addressed because of low attention to addressing these security challenges 
and their importance in grid computing. 
CONCLUSION 
Chapter 2 contains a literature review in terms of the research questions posed in Chapter 1. 
Explanations of various categories of grid systems and their categorisations based on their 
topology were presented. This chapter also explains the various security requirements of a 
grid-based environment in some detail, while the various kinds of security attacks are also 
discussed. In the next chapter (Chapter 3), the research design and methodology are 
presented, which will in turn provide insight into analysis of results presented in Chapter 4. 
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C h a p t e r  3  
RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY 
INTRODUCTION 
In the previous chapter, literature related to the research was presented. The focus areas 
included security, access control, scalability and interoperability. In the present chapter the 
research design and methodology that were applied in the study will be discussed. The 
chapter is divided into two main sections: the first covers the research design while the 
second discusses the methodology that was used. The results obtained in this work are 
divided into three categories: results on scalability, results on interoperability and results on 
access control. 
The results of scalability were achieved through the use of a simulator (G3S) by measuring 
the entities (number of accessed resources against time, average turnaround time against 
number of grid requesters and average turnaround time against number of grid requesters) 
and by evaluating the flexibility of the 3DGBE architecture with one of the traditional 
access control models, mandatory access control (MAC). 
RESEARCH DESIGN  
Crotty (1998) defined the research process in terms of four elements: the epistemological 
stance, the theoretical perspective, the methodology and methods deployed (see Figure 7). 
Epistemology 
Epistemologists acknowledge four main channels of knowledge. They are intuitive 
knowledge, authoritative knowledge, logical knowledge and empirical knowledge. According 
to Cline (2011), 
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“Epistemology is the investigation into the grounds and nature of knowledge itself. 
The study of epistemology focuses on our means for acquiring knowledge and 
how we can differentiate between truth and falsehood”. 
Figure 7: Four elements of the research process (Crotty, 1998, p. 37) 
The research was viewed from the epistemological stance of objectivism. Objectivism 
rejects the notion that a group of people or individuals establish their own reality without 
verification (Dewan, Grundin, & Horvitz, 2007). With objectivism as the dominant 
epistemology, the assumption is that user evaluation and judgmental results can be 
evaluated, verified and quantified (Crotty, 1998). 
Theoretical perspective 
The other aspect of the research design is the use of theoretical perspective: 
“A theoretical perspective is a non-explanatory general framework. It is meant to define  
a point of view within a discipline, which may include basic assumptions that draw 
attention to aspects of a phenomenon. It will then generate questions about it” ( Darke, 
Shanks, & Broadben, 1998). 
Methods 
Epistemology 
Theoretical 
perspective 
Methodology 
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Positivism is a theoretical perspective that allows for systematic, practical and empirical 
evaluation of a natural occurrence that is based on scientific theory and hypotheses about 
interactions among such occurrence (McCroskey & Richmond, 1990). 
In the case of this research, positivism is appropriate, mainly because the research required a 
scientific or qualitative appraisal (Bogdan & Taylor, 1998) of the model and the algorithm 
that was developed. 
Methodology 
Methodology is a strategy or action plan to choose appropriate research methods. In this 
study, soft-system methodology (SSM) was used to manage the research process. 
Soft system methodology (SSM) was conceived by Peter Checkland of Lancaster University 
(Checkland, 2000) as a methodology suitable for research problems with no obvious or 
clearly defined solution, i.e. it is a methodology suitable for solving messy and intricate 
problems. 
The basic shape of SSM (shown in Figure 8) is a cyclical process. The A in this diagram 
depicts a real-world situation of concern. This first phase of the SSM cycle helps to explore 
and define the problem situation. The second phase of the SSM cycle (B in Figure 8) depicts 
relevant systems of purposeful activities. These “purposeful activities” should address the 
problem situation of “How should information on a grid be secured without compromising 
the accessibility and the availability of resources?”. 
The comparison of models with perceived real-world situation (see C in Figure 8) is considered as the 
powerhouse of this methodology. At this level the model is compared with reality and 
insights are drawn from the comparison. Metrics such as turnaround time, grid nodes, users, 
time, throughput and grid service requester are used for this comparison. 
The action needed to improve the situation (see D in Figure 8): is the phase of SSM that determines 
what action is needed to improve the problem situation. 
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Figure 8: The basic shape of SSM (Checkland, 2000, p. 23) 
For this research, the following approaches were followed (see Figure 9). 
Figure 9: The four basic research approaches used in this thesis 
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Methods 
Content analysis 
According to Slarkin, (2010), content analysis explains the act of reviewing the existing 
documentation of related research areas so as to retrieve and extract items of information 
that are useful to the current research and project, hence it should be regarded as an 
important project requirement.  
The analysis was carried out using the interpretive approach. According to Mather (2010), 
the interpretive approach allows a reviewer to read, digest and interpret a given article or 
document so as to draw connections between these documents and the research area 
currently being studied (Cassell & Symon, 1994). Content analysis was carried out to 
determine the strengths and weaknesses of five security models in order to formally 
establish their scalability, interoperability and efficient access control  
Architectural framework and algorithm design 
To find a solution to the identified challenges, an architectural framework was developed. A 
two –stage architecture based on the RBAC model was developed. Stage 1 allows grid users 
to interact with the local security monitoring unit (LSMU) and central security monitoring 
unit (CSMU) for purposes of authorisation and authentication. Stage 2 of the architecture 
makes use of a policy information point (PIP), policy enforcement point (PEP) and policy 
decision point (PDP), all of which are extensible application markup language (XAML) 
protocols to verify and confirm the grid user based on his/her roles. 
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A framework is a pictorial and structural presentation and representation of a proposed 
architecture.  
Figure 10: Simulation cycle using G3S 
Simulation and experimentation 
A grid security services simulator (G3S) was used for simulation and evaluation of the 
framework. G3S was used because it provides adequate support and a suitable mechanism 
for simulating security functionalities (Naqvi & Riguidel, 2005). The simulation cycle is 
depicted in Figure 10. 
The fact that the efforts to obtain reliable and consistent results are good sign of the 
authenticity of the achieved results and, hence, several testing were conducted. The 
objective of the designed framework is to efficiently handle the identified problems during 
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content analysis. Simulation and experimentation were used to evaluate the efficiency of the 
frameworks and algorithms (Figure 10). The results obtained are presented in phases based 
on the SSM methodology adopted.  
APPLICATION OF SSM TO THE RESEARCH PROBLEM  
Figure 11: Application of the SSM, adapted from (Checkland, 2000, p. 23) 
The implementation stages of the SSM methodology (as shown in Figure 11) was divided 
into four phases. The first phase dealt with the identification of challenges using content 
analysis; the second dealt with designing the architectural framework and algorithms and the 
third and fourth stages dealt with simulation and experimentation, as well as a case study 
used for implementing access control. Each of the stages was repeated several times in 
order to obtain consistent and reliable results. 
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Grid security services simulator (G3S) 
 
The evaluation of a complex grid architecture like the one being considered (3DGBE) 
might not be feasibly implemented and carried out in a real grid environment due to the 
flexibility and dynamism of its nature. 
Grid testbeds are very expensive and time consuming because they require various policies 
to be specified for entities ( Sulistio, 2008, p. 24). As a result, it is easier to make use of 
simulator to study and evaluate the complex and intricate scenario. 
The reason for the use of simulators as an alternative to the expensive and tie consuming 
test beds is valid and the efforts have been put to acquire closer to real results. Grid security 
services simulator (G3S) has been used. 
Table 1 provides information on the available grid simulators and their corresponding 
applications. 
Table 1: Grid simulators with their respective applications 
No. Simulator Application on grid References 
1 SimGrid For compiling time and scheduling 
algorithms 
Legrand et. al, 2003 
2 GridSim Scheduling and pricing  Buyya & Murshed, 2002 
3 GangSim Synchronous and asynchronous 
workloads 
Dumitescu & Foster, 2005 
4 OptorSim Stability and transient behavior of 
replication 
Cameron , 2004 
5 G3S Security, access control, and scalability  Syed & Michel, 2005 
Except for G3S none of the simulators is capable of handling any of the security challenges 
such as interoperability, policy level, authentication, usability, confidentiality, trust, scalability 
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and authorization like G3S. This is because; G3S is specifically designed to handle security-
related matter in a grid environment.  
It was developed by Syed Naqvi and Michel Riguidel of Computer Sciences and Networks 
Department of Ecole Nationale Supérieur des Télécommunications (ENST), Paris, France. 
The simulator was released for the experimentation by the developers based on the special 
request by the student and motivation from the supervisor in July, 2010. 
G3S 2.0 is a simulator that allows simulating security functionality in a grid based 
environment. It simulates functionalities such as authorization based on the RBAC security 
model, authentication, and confidentiality based on the Bell LaPadula model. The simulator 
has a graphic user interface (GUI) that allows it to register grid users, creates various 
homogeneous groups, and simulates cases of interaction and communications between 
various entities to reveal and depict how the virtualization of security functionality can exist. 
Aside from being able to simulate the above mentioned functionalities, G3S also has some 
simulation functions like distribution of trust, attack patterns, secure exchange of 
documents and the security policy of the grid.  
As shown in Figure 12, G3S has various buttons that are available for adding new users and 
new nodes, creating VOs and attack patterns, establishing secure exchange of documents 
etc. This ensures scalability/extendability. 
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Figure 12: Graphics User Interface (GUI) of G3S 
The simulator allows various security policies to be configured (see Figure 13). Both the 
security services and policies are easy to create with the aid of this GUI. A VO is selected 
and the configurations are set and saved accordingly. 
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Figure 13: Configuring security services and policies 
With G3S, new computing resources can be added and upgraded while new groups and grid 
users can be dynamically included into the network. Also, new VOs can be established and 
various security services and policies can be dynamically configured. 
Metrics used in the simulation 
It is worth mentioning that each of the challenges addressed in this thesis were evaluated in 
terms of different criteria. Scalability was evaluated using the following metrics: number of 
grid nodes, time (sec; see below), number of accessed resources, average turnaround time 
and number of service requesters, among, others while the method used was simulation. 
Interoperability, on the other hand was addressed and evaluated by using middleware, the 
operating system, a federated database and authorisation between LSMU and CSMU, while 
case study and simulation were the methods used. 
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Roles, services, permissions and hierarchy were the metrics used for evaluating access 
control using a health case study as the method.  
Metrics used in 3DGBE are referred to as the analytical measurement determined to 
measure, calculate and quantify the state of the architectures developed in this thesis. Apart 
from the definitions previously provided, below are the explanations of other metrics used 
for evaluation.  
Number of grid nodes: This is the number of network junctions or network connection points. 
Every terminal, computer, hub and switch is a node. As used in the simulation, the number 
of grid nodes represents the number of network joints simulated for each of the domains. 
Time (sec): Time measured in seconds is the exact time taken to access a certain number of 
resources when a user makes a request in a simulated 3DGBE.  
Number of accessed resources: This is the number of resources granted a user within a given 
period of time.  
Average turnaround time (sec): This is the time taken between the period of request for 
accessing resources in a 3DGBE and the return of detail request output to the grid user.  
Service requesters (grid users): These are the people who access a grid network with the sole 
intention of gaining access to resources. 
Definition of simulation parameters for a triple-domain simulated grid based environment 
Three domains were considered so as to create and establish reasonable and manageable 
grid network among the entities (users and resources) sharing resources. In order to 
evaluate the effectiveness of the simulation of the domains, the parameters defined below 
were taken into consideration. 
Definition 1: Let DSR(A ,B), DSR(A, a), denote the direct security rate which is determined 
and evaluated when the CSMU finds and grants permission and access privilege to a user 
from Domain B to Domain A or from an entity a ∈ Domain A to Domain A depending on 
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from where the access is requested. DSR (A, B, C) denotes the DSR between the three 
designated domains. 
Definition 2: Similarly let SR(A ,B) or SR(A, a) denote the security rate for accesses from 
Domain B to Domain A or for an access from entity a ∈ Domain A to Domain A. SR(A ,B 
,C) denotes the SR between the three designated domains. 
Definition 3: Let Assess(ai ….aj)
m denote assessment for entities ai…aj when ai … aj 
terminates at time step m, and -1 ≤ Assess(ai ….aj)
m ≤ 1 shows either rejection or 
satisfaction during the assessment of the entities involved. While ‘-1’ indicates the rejection 
that will reduce the value of SR, ‘+1’, indicates satisfaction, which will increase the value of 
SR. 
Definition 4: Let DSR(ai.......aj) stands for “Direct Security Rate” in a grid for entities ai.......aj. 
Definition 5: Let Rep(A, a) denote reputation and status of entity a in Domain A on a grid. 
Definition 6: Let Approv(ai … aj)
m stand for the approval in the service request for ai…aj 
after m time steps. 
Determining or evaluating the security rate in a multi-domain grid-based environment is 
completely different from evaluating what is obtainable in a single-domain environment. 
The main reason for this is the interaction and relationship between the grid entities 
involved. Unlike in a single-domain environment, a multi-domain grid environment has 
more entities from one domain to another to interact with. Hence, to handle the 
complexities that arise from the user’s accessibility to the resources of different domains, 
the SRs for the entities of each domain are useful for quick and accurate evaluation of the 
security within different domains. The approach adopted for determining the inter-domain 
security rate value is simple and provides the benefit of feedback that is flexible and 
dynamic in nature. Rep(C, ai) yields status/repute of entity ai to Domain C in a VO when 
considering that ai is not an entity in Domain C. It is worth mentioning that A, B, and C 
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represent three different domains being considered while ai , bi and ci are entities in the three 
domains. 
One of the main benefits of grid computing is to ensure a well-coordinated resource 
distribution and promote unified work between different domains in a flexible grid based 
environments. In order to safeguard and protect each GU’s security and privilege, a 
dependable, secure and efficient access control is important.  
 
Since one of the issues being addressed in this thesis is efficient access control, a new 
calculation approach based on security rate across domains is proposed and analysed by 
taking into consideration the grid entities across the three available domains in a 3DGBE. 
This approach is suitable for a triple-domain architecture and also adaptive for a category of 
architecture with less than three domains. 
 
Parameters defined include SR, DSR, Approv, Rep 
Hence, 
          =                           ……………………………………….……….....(1) 
Equation 1 is used to evaluate the SR in the three domains A, B, C 
With Rep where the weight λ1 and λ2 are positive and λ1 + λ2 ≤ 1. 
    (     )  
∑      ∈        
    
  ……………………………………………………...….(2) 
Where a is an entity from the Domain A. Given two different domains Ai and Aj with i, j ∈ 
2 [1…n], where i ≠ j, and n is the number of domains.  
Therefore, 
           
∑      ∈      
   
………………………………………………….........…..….(3) 
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When considering any domain, A, B or C, Equation 2 is generic and can therefore be used 
to compute DSR between them. The same is applicable to Equation 3 where Domains A 
and C were specifically considered. 
For Domains Ai to Aj with i ≠ j, the status of entities is determined as follows: 
Rep         = ∑     ∈                           …………...…………………....(4)  
where θa > 0 is the weight given to Approv(A, a) for a ∈ A and ∑     ∈  = 1. Equation 3 
implies that the Rep can be determined from any desired domain and can be extended to 
any number of domains. 
Rep is the evaluation of other grid entities from any unusual and unrelated source. The 
values of the weighted factors are associated with the requirements of local security policies 
in each domain. 
 
Approv (ai , aj )
k , implies the Approval degree of service for ai to aj after they finish K times 
services.  
 
Hence,  
Approv(ai , aj )
n = λ1  * Approv (ai , aj )
n-1  + λ1 * V (ai , aj )
n…………….……………....(5) 
 
Rep (Ai, a) =  
∑         ∈         
    
               ……………………………………(6) 
Rep (Ai ,Aj) is the reputation of domain Aj to Ai. This approach introduces a weight Өa, and 
it corresponds with entity a in domain A. An entity with high secure rate is more likely to be 
given access permission than entity with lower security rate. 
Hence, Өa is proportional to SR (Ai ,a). A GU entity’s action in a domain defines and 
influences its access ability to any other domain’s resource, which is a clear and implicit 
restriction to user. 
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Case study: federated database  
It should be recalled that interoperability was evaluated by using middleware, an operating 
system, a federated database and authorisation between the LSMU and CSMU. 
This section explains briefly how a case study was used to achieve interoperability using a 
federated database. 
Figure 14: Schematic representation of 3DGBE interoperability operation flow 
Major challenges concerning getting information from a multi-domain grid environment is 
the variation of data formats and the semantics adopted by the database (Vermeer & Apers, 
1996). As a result, the need for data interoperability for ensuring uniform interpretation and 
analysis of the retrieved information from different domains is important. All the domains 
should submit to a uniform information reference model. As shown in Figure 14, the need 
to aggregate information from different domains is due to various applications being run on 
them. 
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Figure 15: Gridification of the 3DGBE database architecture for interoperability 
The developed framework consists of a three-domain application-sharing environment for 
University, Hospital and Banking. (see Figure 15) A set of classes, attributes and class-
relationships between the three domains are represented. This is made up of various 
concepts that are technically and logically defined by relationship to more than one concept. 
To achieve consistency across the three domains, a shared terminology approach among all 
available sub-domains is essential.  
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Therefore, all three domains’ information will be shared in the same architectural style 
which can be integrated in order to apply the uniform terminology to ensure interoperability 
among the healthcare, university and insurance domains. The proposed FDBS-based 
architecture resolves interoperability problem ranging from diversity of semantic and data 
structures adopted in the databases. 
Each component of the federated database controls its interactions with other components 
by means of export and import schemas. The export schema specifies the information that 
a component will share with other components, while the import schema specifies the 
nonlocal information that a component wishes to manipulate (Frankfort-Nachmias, & 
Nachmias, 1992).  
Each domain adopting a federated database system for achieving the interoperability 
(Vermeer & Apers, 1996) directs controls and monitors its relationship and interactions 
with other domains by means of import, export and private schemas as shown in Figure 16. 
Figure 16: Federated database approach of achieving interoperability in a 3DBGE 
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Declarative language (queries) for interoperability 
A major challenge to developing and implementing an interoperable 3DGBE lies in the 
ability to efficiently, sufficiently express cross-queries (inter-domain queries) that transfer 
information from different domains. To overcome this challenge, a declarative Meta-Query 
Language (MQL) (Vermeer & Apers, 1996) was adopted which is similar to the Structures 
Query Language (SQL). 
MQL was used for querying and restructuring tables containing information across different 
domains. The main characteristic syntax of MQL is obtained directly from SchemaSQL 
(Lakshmanan, Sadri, & Subramanian, 2001), which is noted for higher-range declarations in 
the FROM clause. Another unique feature of MQL is its dynamic output relation which is 
specified in the SELECT clause. As illustrated in the scenario presented, MQL was used to 
query and restructure information across Domains A, B and C within the federated 
database. Hence, we achieved interoperability across these three domains through an MQL 
dynamic query mapping. 
Some of the main characteristics of a language required for implementing interoperability as 
exhibited by MQL include the following (Laks, Fereidoon, & Subbu, 2001): 
i. The language must exhibit expressive power that is not dependent on the 
schema adopted by the database. 
ii. It must allow the rearrangement of a database so as to follow and conform 
to other schema. 
iii. It must permit efficient and effective implementation. 
Three sample schemas are presented (See Appendix E) to describe interoperability using the 
template shown in Figure 16. 
CONCLUSION 
In this chapter, the research approach was presented vis-à-vis the epistemological, 
theoretical perspective, methodology and its related methods. Also, various methods 
adopted in addressing the challenges identified in this thesis were explored and 
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comprehensively discussed. Specifically, this chapter has presented the results obtained 
through content analysis, the approach used in designing the architectural framework, the 
method of simulation and the case study used for evaluation. Since part of this research 
work depends on simulation, a brief discussion on the choice of a simulator was discussed. 
Aside from the above, various definitions of some of the metrics used were defined. Finally, 
this chapter has successfully presented theoretical background as well as the approach used 
for implementing interoperability using a federated database approach. Summarily, this 
chapter has provided an insight into the results presented in chapter 4. In the next chapter, a 
detailed analysis of the results will be presented using the SSM as presented in this chapter. 
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C h a p t e r  4  
RESULTS 
INTRODUCTION 
In the previous chapter, the research approach was presented vis-à-vis, the epistemological, 
theoretical perspective, methodology and its related methods. In this chapter, the results of 
the evaluation and analysis are presented.  
The chapter is structured according to the main sections of Figure 11. The first section 
covers content analysis, the second presents the system activity (architectural framework 
and algorithm design) and the third covers the simulation, experimentation and using the 
model to test its applicability with a case study.  
SSM CYCLE 1: Content analysis 
A: Real-world situation of concern 
Scalability, interoperability and efficient access control have been identified as the major 
challenges confronting the full-scale adoption and utilization of grid computing. The effects 
of each of these have not limited its application alone, but have exposed the user to various 
security challenges resulting from inadequate access procedures in the VO. 
B: Purposeful activity: content analysis 
Grid computing challenges (scalability, interoperability and efficient access control) were 
identified as a concern and studies that address these aspects of grid computing were 
examined to determine commonalities among the reviewed literature.  Content analysis was 
also used to establish a convincing argument regarding the significance of the research and 
where it leads, and to identify, any controversies relevant to the research. It was also used to 
bring to light any inconsistencies in findings relating to this area of study. Finally, it was used 
to identify any unanswered research questions. 
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Figure 17: Content analysis method of identifyed grid challenges with SSM 
Documentation regarding five security models were considered (see Appendix A), namely: 
access control list (ACL), mandatory access control (MAC); role based access control 
(RBAC), community based security model (CBSM), and discretionary access model (DAM). 
The consideration was based on a set of requirements: maturity, usage in the 
implementation of security policies, compatibility with various applications, and the security 
models’ applicability on different platforms. The strengths and weaknesses of each were 
noted. 
Furthermore, these models served as the basis for implementing and achieving access 
control, scalability and interoperability in distributed environments. Three aspects of these 
models were considered: 
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 implementation approach; 
 technical strengths; and 
 technical weaknesses. 
All the models considered (ACL, MAC, RBAC, CBSM and DAM) have the same basic 
principles (see Figure 18). The user is an entity that demands resources through an “access 
request”, and the reference monitor provides a set of access requirements and access 
control policies to be fulfilled before any resource(s) can be accessed by an intended user.  
Figure 18: Basic principle of an access control model 
Grid access control involves a passive object and an active subject, which has a particular 
access operation and a reference control (that either denies access or grants to resources or 
agents) (Higgins, Wilson, & Fell, 2005). On the grid, objects that are shared are various 
distributed resources (e.g. files, databases and supercomputers) and the subjects are the 
users and processes running on behalf of the various users. In most cases, access control is 
located at the user centre or resources centre (Baker, Buyya, & Laforenza, 2002). 
Using content analysis, the implementation approach and strengths and weaknesses of each 
of the access control models were explored. The details of the context analysis are given in 
Appendix A. 
Summary of the five security models 
Table 2 presents a summary of the analysis of the five security models as determined by the 
content analysis. (see Appendix A). 
User Access request Reference monitor 
Resources  
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Table 2: Summarized features of five security models 
Model Applications Strengths Weaknesses 
Access 
control list  
(ACL) 
Constrains access to data and 
files on distributed systems 
User privilege is clearly 
defined, a 
straightforward way of 
denying and granting 
access to resources is 
provided, and genuine 
users are specified for 
their resources 
Lack of interoperability, no 
room for scalability and 
vulnerable to errors 
Mandatory 
access control 
(MAC) 
Allows every user and object to 
be assigned a label called a 
sensitivity label ,which 
comprises compartments and a 
level of secrecy 
Handles intricate 
relationships among 
various entities in any 
computer-based 
environment and 
applications that involve 
sensitive data. 
Difficult to implement, lack of 
interoperability, problem of 
blind write-up, information 
downgrading, not flexible and 
scalable 
Distributed 
Authorization 
Model 
(DAM) 
A user-centered authorization-
oriented model translating a 
global credential to a local one 
Full control by the local 
site director and 
administrator, allows for 
transparency, works 
with other models 
Not flexible, not scalable, 
lacks interoperability 
Context 
Based 
Security 
Model 
(CBSM) 
Handles security challenges 
emanating from the high 
mobility of pervasive 
computing and different 
devices used in these types of 
environment 
Enhances the reuse of 
policy specification, 
allows enforcement as 
well as fine-grained 
access control 
New and requires further 
investigation, suffers from 
underutilization, and has poor 
access control mechanisms 
Role Based 
Access 
Control 
(RBAC) 
Administers individuals with 
roles, permissions and 
hierarchies in a dynamic and 
large-scale distributed 
environment such as a grid 
Appropriate for 
administering various 
security policies; is 
flexible, scalable and 
interoperable; has a 
breadth of applications 
It is being underutilised for 
handling current security and 
access control challenges in a 
distributed environment  
 
D: Action to improve the situation 
Since the primary objective of RBAC is to provide reliable access control of information in 
a VO and ensure security management across the grid network with the aid of role, services 
and permission specification for the user, RBAC was adopted for the development of the 
model framework. Figure 19 shows the statistical analysis of access control research and 
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papers reviewed from 2005 to 2012 and shows that the flexible RBAC model has been 
used for various applications due to its flexibility and ability to handle and solve the 
problems that emanated from the various traditional access control models. 
 
Figure 19:  Adoption rate of the five security models. 2005–2012 
Since 2006, RBAC had the highest rate of adoption of all security models. This was 
deduced after many applications, were observed in business, academe, administration 
systems, industry, the health sector, military operations and many more. Unlike other 
security models, RBAC has no boundary in its application since it is very flexible and 
allows room for both scalability and interoperability. Research carried out by Alessandro 
et. al. (2010) confirmed that RBAC is cost effective, minimizes complexity and reduces 
the cost of access permission management. These benefits have encouraged grid security 
architecture designers to adopt RBAC in managing access control on the grid and are the 
reasons for its adoption in this research project. 
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Adoption rate here is defined as the degree at which various researchers used a particular 
access control model for addressing various security and access control challenges. 
SSM CYCLE 2: Architectural design 
Figure 20: Designing the architectural framework and algorithm 
A: Real-world situation of concern 
RBAC was identified during content analysis as the most appropriate access control model 
for the grid. However, the security challenges, as previously explained, are still a concern. In 
this cycle, the results of the architecture and algorithm design are discussed in terms of the 
SSM (see Figure 20). 
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B: Purposeful activity: architectural design 
Strata of the proposed architecture 
The architecture is presented as two stages, each of which involves two phases (see Figure 
21). 
Phases involved in the proposed architecture 
 
 
 
Grid environment Fourth phase 
 
 
Processing level 
 
Third phase 
 
 
CSMU Second phase 
 
 
 
 
Domains (LSMU) First phase 
Figure 21:  Phases involved in the proposed architecture 
i. The first phase involves various domains. Each of the domains is characterised by a 
user and an LSMU. 
ii. In the second phase, the CSMU interacts directly with all the domains of phase 1. 
iii. The third phase is a processing phase. All activities that result in the granting of 
resources are carried out in this phase. 
iv. The fourth phase is a grid environment phase where many resources are available. A 
user is allowed to access this phase based on a decision made in the third phase. 
Stage 1 of the architecture  
This stage involves the interaction between various users and the domains’ LSMU with the 
CSMU. The architecture below gives comprehensive information with respect to this 
interaction and message passing between grid entities. 
In Figure 22, a theoretical framework of the interaction between the user and the LSMUs of 
three domains, as well as its interaction of the three domains and the CSMU, is depicted. To 
Stage 2 
 
Stage 1 
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explain the process of the architecture presented in Figure 22, let us assume the following 
scenarios: 
i. Adam , a grid user in Domain A, forwards his request to his domain’s LSMU, where 
his authorisation is verified and confirmed. Adam’s status (eligibility as a user) is 
thus determined. This phase makes Adam’s access right to the intended domain 
known. 
ii. The LSMU then sends Adam’s request to access a resource in any intended domain 
to the CSMU to reconfirm his authorisation right in his own domain and his rights 
to access resources of any other domain. The CSMU verifies whether Adam 
qualifies to access the required resource. There are two outcomes: YES (acceptable) 
or NO (not acceptable).  
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Figure 22: STAGE 1 of 3DGBE architectural framework of the proposed model  
 (showing interaction between users, CSMU and LSMU) 
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iii. If NO, the process (request) terminates and the feedback message is communicated 
to the user.  
Figure 23: Information flow sequence of the architecture of Figure 22 
iv. If YES, a “clearance” certificate will be given to the user (Adam) by the LSMU of 
the intended domain and the user can proceed to stage 2. 
v. If there is a successful processing in stage 2, the user will proceed to access 
resources in the grid environment. 
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Algorithm 1: Algorithm describing the working relation of  components in Figure 22 
required : Domain A, Domain B, Domain C, LSMU, CSMU 
begin:  
feedback [authorisation]  =  “Yes or No”; 
 
GU{Domain A, B, C}:                              LSMU:  
  
 If authorisation = “no” 
 then : terminate (process) 
else: 
 if authorisation = “yes” 
 
  Then: LSMU                       CSMU     
 
 
 CSMU                   {(GU (role))}:  
 
 if CSMU [permission(decision)]: = “yes” 
 
then: CSMU                  stage 2; 
stop 
 
 
Table 3: Functions of the architectural components 
Component  Function  
Policy access point 
(PAP) 
Establishes and creates security policies and stores them in the proper security policy 
repository  
Policy enforcement 
point (PEP) 
Carries out access control by creating decision requests and also enforcing decision 
authorisation. PEP also assists in enabling quick and emergency policies as well as setting 
emergency attributes. It performs this by requesting access control decision and 
generating audit records. 
Policy information 
point (PIP) 
Stands as the only source and avenue for attribute values and/or the data that may be 
required for policy evaluation.  
Grid user (GU) The person on the grid that constantly makes a request from one security domain to 
another domain. His/her request in a VO is regulated by the LSMU (inside the domain) 
and CSMU (outside the security user’s local domain). 
The Grid User 
Authentication 
Service (GUAS) 
Is responsible for providing a response to the request made for a privileged operation of 
a user before proceeding in accessing various resources on the grid 
Policy decision point 
(PDP) 
Examines the applicable and usable policies and renders the authorisation decision 
accordingly 
forward 
request 
moves 
 
    Verifies 
authorisation 
request 
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Stage 2 of the architecture 
This stage deals with the interaction between the processing phase and grid environment. 
This stage comes into play if and only if there is a positive feedback during stage 1 (see 
Figure 25). 
Below is the operation of the architecture presented in Figure 25. 
i. Through the grid entry link, the GU requests access (with the role authorisation-
certificate) from the GUAS. The request is either granted or not. 
ii. If the feedback is negative, the entire process will be terminated immediately and the 
request will cease to continue.  
iii. However, if the feedback is positive (YES), then the request will be forwarded to 
the PIP (a protocol of XACML for access control). This is to source detailed 
information about the user. 
iv. The request will further be directed to the PDP, which is another XACML protocol 
for access control. The PDP is responsible for making a decision on whether the 
user may access the requested domain. The feedback of the PDP will either be 
positive (YES) or negative (NO). If the feedback is negative, the entire process 
stops. 
v. If the feedback is YES the request is conveyed to the PEP.  
vi. The PEP will demand an updated version of  the user permission certificate from 
the PDP (grid  VO-PDP). 
vii. A certificate validation/update will be transferred to the centralized resource 
database server (CRDS) from the PDP (grid VO PDP). 
viii. Finally, a message will be sent to the user to proceed and access resources on the 
grid. 
The procedure is applicable from either of the domains available on the grid i.e. either 
Domain A to Domain B or from Domain A to Domain C, and vice versa. 
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In order to ensure smooth and efficient access control on the grid and also to improve the 
performance of the architecture, the LSMU works with the CSMU. That is, there is smooth 
correspondence between the local security units of all the domains with the central security 
unit for the entire grid. They both communicate and work hand in hand to achieve a 
flexible, interoperable and scalable grid environment. 
Algorithm 2: Describing the working scenario of the architecture presented in Figure 25 
 
require: role, user, PIP, PEP, PDP, GUAS, CRDS 
Feedback: [yes/no]: 
   begin: from stage 1: 
 request:                     GU role certificate [GEL] 
    
 then: GUAS                             Role (GU); 
    
   Else: if feedback (GUAS) = “No” 
             Then: terminate (process); 
 
   if feedback (GUAS) = “YES”; 
Then: request                       PIP; 
   
     PIP:                   PDP;  //request for appropriate decision 
  
  If feedback = “yes” 
proceed:                 PEP; 
 
  Else if feedback = “No” 
   then: stop (process) 
Getupdate:                     PDP-VO; 
 
update (certificate):                   CRDS; 
 
finalDecison:                          (VO (grid)) 
Begin [GU] :access [resource] 
stop 
 
Overview of the basic components of the architecture 
In the proposed model, each of the domains available in the VO has a LSMU that is 
responsible for the domain’s local security access control and management. An advanced 
access control and management unit, called the CSMU handles access control and 
Verifies 
proceeds 
request 
obtained 
by 
Pass to 
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authorisation interactions for the various grid entities across the three domains of the 
model. The CSMU within its capacity, along with the LSMU ensures interoperability, 
scalability, flexibility and secure access control for various grid entities across multiple 
administrative domains through inter-domain interaction; as well as application 
independence and its ability to accommodate additional grid entities. 
For any access request by a grid user, the LSMU would verify the user’s access privilege. 
The model is based on the adoption of the XACML’s request-response protocol, which 
makes use of four basic components. The components are the PEP, PDP, PIP and PAP. 
However, in this model, only the PEP, PDP and PIP are used because of their relevance, 
usefulness and application in the proposed architecture.  
Basic assumptions 
The following were assumed: 
1. A user from Domain A (Adam) may intend to access a resource in Domain B and a 
user in Domain B (Ben) may also be interested in accessing resources from Domain 
A. 
2. A user in Domain A (Adam) may wish to access resources in Domain C, while a 
user in Domain C (Charles) may equally be interested in the resources of Domain 
A. 
These are two possible scenarios when a three-domain-based architecture is being 
considered. Scenario 1 is explained in Figures 28 and 31 and is equally applicable to the 
other scenario. 
Adam, Charles and Ben are users in the Domains A, B and C respectively. Each of them is 
bound by the security and access framework in their respective domains. There are six ways 
in which access could be requested: 
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Figure 24: A 3DGBE stage 2 architectural framework information flow process of Figure 25 
A           B; A            C; B            A;  B              C; C            A or C            B.  
Where “             “  implies a request from one domain to another. 
Operational overview of the model 
The access control across three grid domains is complex and problematic. The security of 
the individual domains is quite dependable and efficient, because each of the domains has 
its own access control and monitoring policy, which is monitored by the LSMU. However 
If a user wishes to access resources in another domain, the user from the designated domain 
will first need to be verified by his domain. This is achieved by translating the certificate of 
his domain to the domain in which he wishes to access resources. The translation (or 
conversion) targets the access privileges and the identities in other domains on the grid. The 
CSMU is mainly in charge of monitoring and overseeing access and the security relationship 
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from one domain to another domain depending on where an entity is seeking access. Also, 
the CSMU is equally responsible for maintaining the information for the mapping of the 
interaction for the various domains. The process and the procedure for accessing resources 
across various domains are shown in Figures 28 and 31. 
C: Model comparison and appraisal 
Comparisons were made with respect to the architecture designed severally with the existing 
models. The newly developed architecture and algorithms were compared with the existing 
ones. The flaws and weaknesses discovered in previous designs are addressed in this 
research namely, lack of interoperability, inefficient access control and non-scalable grid 
based-environment. In summary, both the algorithms and the architectural framework were 
appraised based on the capacity to redeem and rectify the weaknesses of the existing 
models. 
D: Action to improve the model 
Both architecture and algorithms were improved upon by redesigning them in order to 
address the challenges that arose. The cyclical approach of SSM has assisted in continually 
improving the design in order to handle scalability, interoperability and access control 
challenges. 
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Figure 25: STAGE 2 of 3DGBE architectural framework of the proposed model  
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SSM CYCLE 3: Simulation 
A: Situation of concern 
The simulation (see Figure 26) was carried out on the designed framework and algorithms 
in order to evaluate the performance of the architecture for addressing the challenges of 
scalability and interoperability. 
 
Figure 26: Simulation of designed framework and algorithms 
B: Model comparison and appraisal 
The results obtained with the metrics evaluated were compared with the expected results. 
The metrics being referred to are: average turnaround time and number of grid nodes; 
Action to improve the situation 
Obtaining several results to affirm the validity of 
the simulation. Eight different results were 
obtained to ensure reliability in the simulation 
process. 
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average turnaround time and number of grid service requesters; throughput and number of 
grid nodes; number of access resources and the time. It was observed that as the number of 
grid nodes increased the average turnaround time reduced and thereby increased the 
number of service requesters (grid users) on the grid. (see Figure 29). 
 The result also showed that as the number of service requesters increased, there was 
little effect on the turnaround time, which did not impact on the users’ services and 
request time. (see Figure 30). 
 It could also be deduced that as the number of grid node increased, the throughput 
also increased thereby increasing the number of resources being accessed within a 
given time. This proved the scalability of the 3DGBE architecture. (see Figure 31). 
Several parameters were used in order to attain good simulation results. 
C: Action to improve the situation 
Eight different simulations were conducted for two metrics measured at a time for the 
experiments whose results are presented in Figures 29 and 30. The objective of this was to 
obtain valid, consistent and dependable results. The final results represented a valid 
outcome of the simulation. The mean, standard deviation and variance of the experiments 
whose results are presented in Figure 29 and 30 are calculated. (see Appendix F). 
First stage implementation: SCALABILITY 
Various simulation experiments have been carried out using different simulators. In this 
case, the Grid Security Services Simulator (G3S) was used. This is because; G3S is the only 
simulator that has security and access control functionalities. To carry out an empirical 
evaluation of the access control architecture, our simulation was developed in Java by using 
Jbuilder. There were three different domains in our experimental grid based environment: 
A, B and C. Domain A was made up of a cluster of computers that comprised seven nodes 
while the other two domains were LANs (local area networks) with 13 computers each. The  
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Figure 27: Number of available resources in two access control policies (3DGBE and MAC) 
 
simulated grid environment was developed using the Globus toolkit 5.0.5. All the hardware  
of the testbed was embedded in Linux Ubuntu 12.04. A computer hosted a database with 
the information of all users and acted as the LSMU for each domain, while a computer 
server with a static IP address was chosen as the CSMU for the experimental grid. For 
efficient and reliable evaluation, we considered resources and entities that were accessible 
when a grid user requested their services. The result of our experiment revealed efficiency in 
terms of interoperability, scalability and efficient access control. 
In the experiment, we compared 3DGBE access control and MAC, which is a popular 
access control method. Table 4 provides the detail of the parameters used in the simulation 
experiment. Users were provided with both a MAC-based and 3DGBE access control 
simultaneously. The number of resources was varied over different time periods. It was 
noted that the number of available resources varied over time in the 3DGBE access control 
architecture, whereas it remained unchanged in the MAC-based access control system; see 
Figure 27. 
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Comparing with MAC, 3DGBE access control performs tremendously better in terms of 
the number of accessed resources with a number ranging between 2 and 12 while the MAC 
remains at a constant of 4 which is below the average of 8 for 3DGBE access control. This 
means more flexibility of 3DGBE. 
Table 4: Simulation parameters with their corresponding values 
No. Parameters Corresponding values 
1. λ1 0.25 
2. λ 2 0.36 
3. DSR(ai…..aj) 0.34 
 
Equation 2:     (     )   
∑      ∈        
    
……………………….…(2) was used to 
evaluate access without considering any weights. Entities in either Domain A, B or C would 
request resources from any desired domain and such requests would be evaluated by the 
destination domain. The result of SR was thereafter obtained. The result is shown in Figure 
28.  
 
Figure 28: Secure rate comparison using two approaches 
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DSR and SR are two different defined parameters. DSR was defined for the evaluation of 
“Direct Security Rate” while SR was defined for “Security Rate”. Computable values were used 
and varied between the intervals 0-1.  
Equation 1:           =                           …………………..….….....(1) was 
used for calculating the SR between the domains. The security rate value will vary if there 
are no weighted values for θj. The secure rate of the approach with weighted factor seems 
to be better as projected than that without weighted factor. Table 5 gives a summary of the 
required parameters. 
In order to arrive at the final result as presented in Figure 28,  the values of parameters used 
(λ1, value of DSR(A,B,C), value of Rep(A,B,C), entities in Domain A , entities in Domain B  
and entities in Domain C were consistently varied. Different results were also obtained. This 
was done so as to reliably yield the same and comparable result with varied values. 
Table 5: Simulation parameters for λ1, DSR, Rep for Domains A, B, and C 
 and the number of entities of each domain 
No. Parameters Corresponding values 
1 λ1 0.6 
2 First (initial) value of DSR(A,B,C) 0.58 
3 First (initial) value of Rep(A,B,C) 0.44 
4 Entities in Domain A 20 
5 Entities in Domain B 15 
6 Entities in Domain C 23 
 
The direct relation between the number of grid nodes available and the turnaround time has 
been established and the nodes have direct influence on the time. 
Three different machines were set up for Domains A, B and C enabled with Globus 5.0, 
gLite and Alchemi middleware as well as Unix, Linux and Windows operating systems 
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respectively.  The turnaround time obtained for each of the domains based on the resources 
required when the number of grid nodes was varied. The average turnaround time for the 
entire grid was plotted against the number of grid nodes. The results are presented in Figure 
29 and 30. The mean, standard deviation and variance were calculated using ANOVA (see 
Appendix F).  
 
The simulation result revealed that the number of grid nodes that are available has a direct 
influence on the turnaround time, as shown in Figure 29.  
This implies that as the number of grid nodes increases the average turnaround time 
reduces, and thereby increases the number of service requesters (grid users) on the grid. To 
further prove the argument that the model developed and implemented is scalable, Figure 
30 shows that as the number of service requesters increases, there is a slight effect on the 
turnaround time, which does not impact on the users’ services and request time. 
  
Figure 29:  Average turnaround time versus number of grid nodes 
A scalable architecture should give room for expansion and increase in network and 
resources through additional grid nodes and users. This is to allow additional resources and 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 4: Results  78 
 
 
 
users on the grid network. For any architecture to be considered as scalable, it should be 
able to meet both present and future throughput. 
 
Figure 30: Average turnaround time versus number of service requesters 
In order to prove that the 3DGBE architecture is scalable, we observed and measured the 
effect of an increase in the number of nodes against the volume of data that is transferred 
within a given period of time (throughput). 
The initial setup indicated that Domains A, B and C contain 7, 13 and 13, nodes 
respectively. To ascertain the effect of increase in nodes on the performance of the 
throughput, the number of nodes in each domain was increased as follows: Domain A to 12 
nodes; Domain B to 20 nodes and Domain C to 25 nodes.  
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Figure 31: Throughput (MB/s) vs number of nodes 
To study the performance of nodes against throughput, two experiments were conducted 
on two different machines already deployed with G3S. For the first machine, a Windows 
operating system enabled with GLite middleware was used. From the hardware’s point of 
view, Pentium-4 (P4), 4.5 GHz processor was used with 4 GB RAM.  
The second experiment was carried out on a machine where Linux operating system was 
installed with Globus 5.0. The hardware is made of Intel i3 processor + mother board 
7000rs, 5GB RAM 850rs and 500 GB H-disk 1700. 
Having achieved the results concerning the measurement of effect of grid nodes on the 
throughput, it is worthy of mentioning that these seemingly interesting results were also 
affected by the configuration of each of the machines. Most importantly, Globus 5.0 runs 
faster on Linux operating system and thereby produces greater values on the return of the 
turnaround time as depicted in Figure 32. Conversely, GLite runs slowly especially when 
enabled with windows operating system.  
From Figure 31 it can be deduced that as the number of grid node increases, the throughput 
also increases, thereby increasing the number of resources being accessed at a given time. 
This further proves the scalability of the 3DGBE architecture. The result obtained as shown 
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in Figure 31 shows an increase in throughput as follows: when the number of grid nodes in 
Domain A is 12, the throughput is 100MB/s, when the number of grid nodes is Domain B 
is increased to 20 , the throughput is 2200MB/s, while 3100MB/s is attained when the 
number of grid nodes in Domain C is increased to 25. 
Conversely, the effect of decreasing in grid node across domains was measured in terms of 
throughput and the result is presented in Figure 32. 
 
Figure 32: Decreased effect of grid nodes on throughput 
The result obtained indicates the gross decrease in the throughput due to the reduction in 
the number of grid node across the three domains on the grid. 
The results obtained in Figure and 32 therefore seem inconsistent in terms of the expected 
throughput due to the hardware and software configuration of the two machines. 
Second stage implementation: INTEROPERABILITY 
Interoperability can be defined as the capability of various domains to bring together 
resources and operate in a collaborative manner without any constraint. Interoperability 
plays an important role in resource sharing in a multi-domain environment. A grid-based 
environment that is not interoperable poses a security challenge to resources across multiple 
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administrative domains as users scramble to access resources from domains other than 
theirs without success. An effective interoperable VO requires sharing interactions among 
potential grid participants and, as such, interoperability in terms of people, services and 
various resources is one of the main issues addressed. 
To this end, in order to achieve efficient interoperability in a 3DGBE environment, four 
basic approaches were focused on, namely:  
a. Grid middleware services; 
b. Appropriate handling of authentication and authorisation through LSMU and 
CSMU;  
c. Operating system interoperability; and 
d. A federated database. 
Interoperability with grid middleware (using tri-middleware integration in 3DGBE) 
Aneka, Alchemi (Luther, Buyya, Ranjan, & Venugopal, 2005), Cosm P2P Toolkit , Globus, 
,Gridbus, Grid Datafarm, GridSim (Toolkit for Grid Resource Modeling and Scheduling 
Simulation),Jxta Peer to Peer Network, Legion, NorduGrid middleware (Buyya & 
Venugopal, 2004), PUNCH, Simgrid, Storage Resource Broker (SRB), ProActive, Unicore, 
and Vishwa are prominent among the grid middleware (Buyya, 2002). With some of the 
listed grid middlewares, the VO interoperability issue remains unabated. This is because of 
the absence of upper-level semantic concepts on their (grid middleware) layers (Welch & 
Lathrop, 2003).  
To address this challenge, a tri-middleware integration approach was used (see Figure 33) 
Middleware can be regarded as: 
“A mediator layer that provides a consistent and homogeneous 
access to resources managed locally with different syntax and access methods” ( Priol, 2008, p. 32) 
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As shown in Figure 33, the 3DGBE was enabled with three different middlewares across 
the three available domains on the grid. The middlewares used were Globus 5.0, gLite and 
Alchemi for domains A, B and C, respectively. 
Figure 33: Tri-middleware integration based infrastructure for 3DGBE interoperability 
With this approach to grid interoperability, which is based only on middleware integration, 
various middleware were deployed on different domains to allow the same set of users to 
share and access resources with well-established and defined virtual organisation policies, 
irrespective of the grid middleware they intend to use. 
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The problem of middleware differences was solved by the effective usage of common 
standards that also take into consideration all the features of each middleware, which were 
arranged as a subset of specifications that needed to be implemented in different grid 
middleware.  
In this approach to interoperation based on middleware integration, different middleware 
do not necessarily need to communicate with each other in order to have three or more grid 
infrastructures based on them to be able to merge and share resources.  
Various computing resources currently installed in the three domains were all made 
accessible to all the grid users independently of the middleware they intended to adopt. The 
concept is depicted in Figure 33. 
Consequent upon the implementation of middleware integration across the three domains, 
the aggregation of three or more grid resources was easier and the grid user in any of the 
three domains could decide where and when to access resources without hindrance.  
Aside from Globus 5.0.2, the other two middleware installed for the interoperability 
integration testing were gLite and Alchemi. The choice of these three middleware was due 
to their availability (diffusion) and for technical reasons. Their availability has to do with the 
presence and relevance of these middleware in South Africa while the technical factor has to 
do with the variation in their architectural models and the likelihood of integrating every 
component into a uniform entity. 
Basically, local clusters and security are considered as the basic elements of infrastructure 
that could be reused to aid interoperability across the three domains.  Globus 5.0.2, gLite 
and Alchemi aid Torque/MAUI as the local scheduler that supports the ability to share local 
clusters and all available resources. Also, all these middleware use X.509 certificates, hence 
the same grid resources can be accessed, shared and distributed by these three different grid 
middleware. 
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Achieving interoperability with three different middleware is simple with Globus 5.0.2, gLite 
and Alchemi. Both gLite and Alchemi adopted the grid system infrastructure (GSI) model 
developed by Globus for user authorisation. This model (GSI) makes use of digital 
certificates and proxies for the authentication and authorisation of hosts and users. 
Established on X.509 digital certificates and proxies, GSI was extended in both the gLite 
and Alchemi (Rahman & Davis, 2009) with the agreement of the Virtual Organisation 
Membership Service (VOMS), which releases fully X.509 compatible signed extensions to 
proxies. Additional information about users that is required for the mapping on various 
levels of authorisation is achieved through these extensions. Since VOMS proxy is 
compatible with X.509 proxy, the former’s proxy can be taken as authentication and 
authorisation credential when deploying on the three grid middleware. 
The distribution of resources across a tri-middleware based architecture is the second 
method of achieving interoperability. The cluster manager in charge of the local resources 
was configured in such a way that jobs can be submitted despite differences in middleware. 
The local scheduler in architecture is Torque/MAUI. This scheduler is supported by 
Globus 5.0.2, gLite and Alchemi, hence it is very easy to express new queues new and added 
middleware in order to utilise the same resources. 
Appropriate handling of authentication and authorisation through the LSMU and CSMU  
The CSMU maintains a high degree of interoperability between the users on the grid. For 
any resource request to be allowed, after approval has been given by the local security 
monitoring unit (LSMU), the former serves as the central nerve through which the final 
decision is made to permit grid resources to be accessed. There is smooth correspondence 
between the LSMU of each of the three domains and the CSMU. The purpose of this is to 
ensure an adequate and efficient data-sharing mechanism among the domains with a view to 
achieving interoperation through authorisation. The CSMU forwards the request of a grid 
user confirming his/her authorisation to access resources. 
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This new authorization and authentication approach also addresses the challenges of 
existing grid systems' access control procedures. Firstly, using a centralized authorization 
server (a CSMU) to manage the access control policies within an organization unit range 
greatly minimizes the administrative burden on each individual domain. 
Secondly, at the application level, a grid user can check his/her authentication and 
authorization information details prior to sending access requests to various domains. This 
makes resource allocation processes within the grid system more effective, reliable and 
efficient.  
Thirdly, by applying RBAC to specify access control policies on the authorization server, 
the authorization approach is flexible and dynamic, and provides fine-grained access control 
privileges to system resources. 
All these features combine to undoubtedly aid interoperability across the three domains 
existing on the grid. 
Operating system interoperability 
To investigate interoperability for 3DGBE, Tivoli Storage Manager (TSM), was used across 
the three domains on the grid. Domains A, B, C were embedded with UNIX, LINUX and 
Windows operating systems, respectively (see Figure 33) Interoperability was achievable 
across the domains by setting up and establishing a consistent naming convention and 
strategy across the domains. TSM is a dedicated and centralised enterprise class recovery 
package and policy-based software that allows various users to share, collaborate and 
integrate across domains irrespective of the operating system used. 
Aside from the fact that the architecture permits various applications to run (application 
interoperability), the architecture has proved to be interoperable on the UNIX, LINUX, 
(Ubuntu 10.04) and Windows operating systems that were deployed with different 
middleware (Globus, Glite and UNICORE).  
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A comparative evaluation of 3DGBE was carried out against the existing access control 
models (MAC, CAS, AKENTI and PERMIS) by providing a uniform number of resources 
for access within a given period of time on a TSM API. Efficiency was measured by 
calculating the ratio of accessible resources within a given time frame. 
In comparing the level of interoperability of 3DGBE with other access control models, the 
efficiency was determined by measuring the ratio of resources accessed with the response 
time. This was achieved when UNIX, LINUX (Ubuntu 10.04) and Windows operating 
systems were deployed with Globus, Glite and UNICORE middleware. Table 6 gives values 
obtained. 
Table 6: Comparative evaluation of interoperability of 3DGBE with other models 
User Models No of resources 
accessed 
Response time (sec) Efficiency (η) 
A MAC 60 120 0.5 
B 3DGBE  130 25 5.2 
C CAS 101 89 1.13 
D AKENTI 98 45 2.2 
E PERMIS 34 56 0.61 
The efficiency denoted as (η) is a measure of the ratio of the number (no.) of resources 
accessed (retrieved) to the response time (sec) using a specific model. 
1.  Efficiency (η) for MAC   = No. of resources accessed / Response time (sec) 
                                                 = (60 / 120) 
                                                 = 0.5 
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2.   Efficiency (η) for 3DGBE = No. of resources accessed / Response time (sec) 
                                                  = (130 / 25) 
                                                  = 5.2 
3.   Efficiency (η) for CAS = No. of resources accessed / Response time (sec) 
                                                   =   (101 / 89) 
                                                   =   1.13 
4.   Efficiency (η) for AKENTI = No. of resources accessed / Response time (sec) 
                                                  = (98 / 45) 
                                                  = 2.2 
5.   Efficiency (η) for PERMIS = No. of resources accessed / Response time (sec) 
                                                 = (34 / 56) 
                                                 = 0.61 
 
Figure 34: Comparative evaluation of interoperability of 3DGBE with the existing system 
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To buttress the fact that 3DBGE is interoperable, a comparative analysis was made with 
other prototypes currently available and the result is provided in Figure 34. 
A federated database: data interoperability in a 3DGBE 
Implementation 
For the sake of explicitness and clarity, to implement interoperability in 3DGBE using the 
approach depicted in Figure 15, we created different databases for each of the domains. A 
university database, hospital database and banking database were created for Domains A, B 
and C, respectively. They are depicted in Tables 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17 and 18 
respectively. 
The information of all three domains was interrelated. Ensuring interoperability therefore 
did not only allow information sharing across domains, but prevented data redundancy 
across the three levels of architecture. 
Efforts made at ensuring that the three domains become interoperable for information 
involved data integration, which involved aggregating and combining sources of data in all 
domains, i.e. multiple, distributed sources and locations to give a single and central database 
using a federated database system. This involved integrating different applications across 
varied platforms such as Windows and Linux operating systems. It also involved developing 
libraries of schema to ensure data sharing.  
Test scenario 
Three different databases were created for Domains A, B and C, namely a university, 
hospital and a banking database respectively. The university database comprised four tables 
(see Tables 10-14 in Appendix B), while the hospital has three tables (see Table 14-16 in 
Appendix B) and the banking database two tables (see Tables 17-18 in Appendix B). 
Inter-domain queries 
In order to achieve interoperability from the database created for the domains, the 
following approaches were adopted: 
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i. A query was issued for databases in Domains A and B and the 
corresponding result was obtained. 
ii. Another query was issued for databases in Domains A and C using 
Metal-Query Language. 
iii. Finally, a query was issued for Domains A, B and C and the result 
obtained were presented accordingly. 
CASE 1: two different databases were created for Domains A and B and they needed to be 
aggregated and joined to enhance further operations through queries. To achieve this, the 
query below was issued and the result obtained showed that the databases in Domains A 
and B were joined together for further operation. The query is given in Figure 41. 
 
 
Figure 35: Query for aggregating data from Domains A and B 
 
CASE 2:  in an attempt to combine all the information on the databases of Domains A and 
C, the following query was issued and the report generated shows a UNION of both 
databases for both domains. The query is given in Figure 36. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 36: Query for aggregating data from Domains A and C 
 
 
SELECT DB1.*, DB2.* 
FROM DomainA.Database1.dbo.myTable AS DB1 
INNER JOIN DomainB.Database2.dbo.myTable AS DB2 
   ON DB1.id = DB2.id 
 
 
-- FROM Domain_A 
SELECT * 
FROM [MyDatabaseOnDomain_A].[dbo].[MyTable] Table1 
   INNER JOIN  
 [Domain_C].[MyDatabaseOnDomain_C].[dbo].[MyOtherTable] Table2 
        ON Table1.ID = Table2.ID 
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Figure 37:  Cross-domain query for joining data from Domains A, B and C 
The cross-domain queries were then applied to each of the newly obtained tables. To obtain 
IDNO, Surname, and Nationality from Table 8; File No, Patient_Condition and Age from 
Table 8; as well as Service_Code and Tax_ID from Table which belong Domains A, B and 
C respectively, the following condition holds: 
   “a" , “b” and “c” are used as the aliases for Table 11, Table 15 and Table 18 
respectively. Hence the following cross-domain query was used. The result obtained 
(see Appendix C) shows the possibility of integrating data from various domains. 
Aside from the above queries, some other queries were issued to "SELECT" and "JOIN" 
databases across domains. The cross-domain queries were introduced purposely to handle 
the heterogeneity of information represented in different structures and to provide distinct 
aggregation capability in addition to the principal objective of multi-domain database 
interoperability. (See Appendix C for the report generated on the queries.) 
1. SELECT a.Student_NO, a.Surname,a.Nationality, 
2. b.File_No,b.Patient_Condition, b. Patient_Account, 
3. c.Service_Code, c. Account_ID, c.Tax_ID,b.Age   
4. FROM Table16 c,Table13 b,Table9 a   
5. ;   
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Third stage of implementation: EFFICIENT ACCESS CONTROL 
  
Figure 38: A case study approach using SSM 
The last stage of SSM application is the case study to analyse and implement a real word 
situation of concern (i.e. access control) as depicted in Figure 38 . 
SSM cycle 4: Case study 
A: Situation of concern 
Efficient access control has been identified as the challenge. It is the last stage of 
implementation being considered in this work. 
Action to improve the situation 
Continuous testing with different 
data to ensure the validity of the 
results. 
 
Content analysis 
 
Designing a framework 
and algorithms 
 
A 
B 
C 
D 
Model comparison and appraisal 
Comparison with the similar case studies and 
appraising the results with the expected output. 
 
 
 
A real- world 
situation of concern 
 
Yield choices 
1 
3 
Scalability 
Interoperability 
Access control in a grid 
 
4 
Simulation 
 
Case study  
 
2 
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B: Alternative way of solution 
The RBAC model introduces role hierarchies (RH). Role hierarchies are defined for 
positioning and structuring various specified roles to reflect and present an organisation’s 
line of responsibility and authority (Saeed & Reena, 2012 ). With role hierarchy, there is a 
role/role relation which defines user membership along with their various privilege 
inheritances. It presents organisational functional delineations and structures. 
A typical role hierarchy as implemented for 3DGBE is presented in Figure 39. By standard 
and ab initio convention of role hierarchy, more strong and powerful (senior) roles are 
placed over those at the lower level (junior). As for 3DGBE, hierarchies are specified for 
the three domains with H1, H2 and H3 for domains A, B and C respectively. 
A case study of e-health is used for each of the three domains. Different roles, permissions, 
domain hierarchies are specified. Using hierarchical RBAC, the Physician role which is 
defined in domain A with hierarchy H1 can have additional permissions to those from other 
two domains (Domains B and C). The inheritance of permission is transitive in nature 
across the three domains. For example, Physician, Cardiologist and Neurologist have 
different permissions already assigned to them in their domain (Domain A). They also have 
multiple permissions from other domain as specified in Table 7.  
Also, Patient, Nurse, Pharmacist and Psychiatrist have their permissions domiciled in 
Domain B, the hierarchical nature of RBAC has their access permission extended to 
Domain C. 
In short, Domain A roles with hierarchy H1 could access information in domain B and C. 
Domain B roles with hierarchy H2 has permissions to services in its domain as well as 
domain C. Finally, only Domain C role could not be permitted to access further 
information from any other domain except those defined within its hierarchy (H3).  
If however, a GU in a domain whose hierarchy is lower decides to gain permission or 
intends to access resources in a higher hierarchical domain, such a request shall be denied. 
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Table 7:  Multiple inheritance of permission in a 3DGBE 
Role Domains Permission Multiple inheritance 
of permission 
Physician, Cardiologist, Neurologist, Obstetrician, 
Pathologist, Pulmonologist, Surgeon, Pediatrician, 
Oncologist, Dermatologist 
A P{A} P{A}, P{B},P{C} 
Patient , Nurse, Pharmacist, Dentist, Psychiatrist, 
Podiatrist 
B P{B} P{B},P{C} 
Ultrasound Technologist, X-Ray Technician, Clinical 
Technologist, Clinical Technologist, Dental Assistant, 
Dental Laboratory Technician 
C P{C} P{C} 
A case study scenario of an e-health system using the RBAC was implemented 
Hierarchical RBAC was adopted. Domains A, B and C were given hierarchies H1, H2 and 
H3, respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 39: Implementation of hierarchical RBAC in 3DGBE 
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The implementation of access control was carried out successfully with the implementations 
of the architecture depicted in Figure 39 and Figure 40 respectively. Each domain has well 
defined roles for each of the grid users, depending on the hierarchy of his/her domain. 
In Figure 40, the procedure through which hierarchical RBAC (Ren, Zuo, Li, Niu, & Yang, 
2010) in 3DGBE was implemented is shown. A user coming from either Domain A, B or C 
has his/her identity authenticated by both the LSMU and CSMU respectively. The 
individual user’s assigned role is monitored and guided by the corresponding domain 
hierarchy. The privileges available within the three domains are determined thereafter. 
Terms and definitions as used in this context  
• Let H1, H2 and H3 denote the hierarchies and let the role hierarchy (RH) denoted 
as H1, H2 and H3 be assigned to Domains A, B and C, respectively where H1 > 
H2 > H3 
It could be recalled that:  
“hierarchy is mathematically a partial order defining a seniority relation 
 between roles, whereby the seniors’ roles acquire the permission of their juniors,  
and junior roles acquire the user membership of their seniors” 
 ( Ferraiol, Sandhu, Gavrila, Kuhn, & Chandranouli, 2001). 
•     Let Role_Domain A denote all roles defined in Domain A. 
•     Let Role_Domain B denote all roles defined in Domain B. 
•     Let Role_Domain C denote all roles defined in Domain C. 
• Resources- can be any system resource that could be subject to access control, 
such as database record, a file, etc. 
• Operation – could be an executable part of a program which, when invoked causes 
some basic function for the user to be executed. 
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• Permission-is an authorized approval given to an entity to carry out/perform 
operation on objects protected by RBAC access policy. 
• Role- is the assigned function within the context of a particular domain of a grid 
network along with the associated semantics concerning the responsibility and 
authority given to a user to carry out.  
• User (grid user) –is a person who requires access privilege to resources from one 
domain to another in a grid-based environment. 
For implementation purposes therefore, hierarchical role-based access control was adopted 
to specify roles, services and permissions for each user from any domain. A scenario 
(Health) was considered in with each of the domains had roles, services and permission 
defined among the users. E-health was used as a case study because of the sensitive nature 
of the services, roles and permissions given to people involved in health-related services. 
Algorithm 3: Algorithm for efficient access control in a 3DGBE 
Required: Domains A, B and C, LSMU, CSMU 
Grid user (GU) identification; 
Get the Domain’s hierarchy as {H1, H2, H3}; 
Assign hierarchy to the chosen domain; 
Obtain GU role; 
Retrieve GU services - permission; 
Proceed to the grid 
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Figure 40: Description of hierarchical RBAC access control policy for 3DGBE 
The full-scale description of how hierarchical RBAC was implemented for 3DGBE is 
shown in Figure 40. A GU from either Domain A, B and C is first subjected to 
authorisation and authentication by their respective LSMU and CSMU and thereafter have 
their domain hierarchies confirmed.  
After this has been achieved, the final security checking of GU by the CSMU will be carried 
out, where each service requester has his/her roles, services and access privileges retrieved 
from the “database repository” and “grid services repository” respectively.  
For the purpose of clarity, roles, services and permissions description for Domain A, B, and 
C are presented below. 
Role and services specification for DOMAIN A 
    Role_Domain A = {Physician, Cardiologist, Neurologist, Obstetrician, 
Pathologist, Pulmonologist, Surgeon, Pediatrician, Oncologist, Dermatologist} 
     Services (permission)  
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i. {Physician (write patient record, read patient record, write prescription, read 
prescription, examine patient)} 
ii. {Cardiologist (treat heart disease, write patient record, read patient record, 
write prescription, read prescription)} 
iii. {Neurologist (treat brain, examine nervous system, write patient record, read 
patient record)} 
iv. {Obstetrician (provide pregnancy care, delivers babies, write patient record, 
read patient record)} 
v. { Pathologist (interpret disease, examine tissue, read patient record, write 
prescription, read prescription)} 
vi. {Pulmonologist  (treat respiratory problems, write prescription, read 
prescription)} 
vii. {Surgeon (perform operations, write patient record, read patient record)} 
viii. { Pediatrician (treat children, write prescription, read prescription)} 
ix. {Oncologist (treat cancers, read patient record)} 
x. { Dermatologist (treat skin, write prescription)} 
Role and services specification for DOMAIN B 
     Role_Domain B ={Patient , Nurse, Pharmacist, Dentist, Psychiatrist, 
Podiatrist} 
    Services (permission)  
i. {Patient (read prescription , read patient record)} 
ii. {Nurse (write patient record, read prescription, read patient record)} 
iii. {Pharmacist (read prescription, read patient record, select prescription)} 
iv. {Dentist (treat teeth, carry out operation, read prescription, read patient 
record)} 
v. {Psychiatrist (treat mental patient, recommend drug , read prescription, read 
patient record)} 
vi. { Podiatrist (treat human foot, treat lower leg , treat heel spurs , read patient 
record, write prescription)} 
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Role and services specification for DOMAIN C 
     Role_Domain C ={Ultrasound Technologist, X-Ray Technician, Clinical 
Technologist, Clinical Technologist, Dental Assistant, Dental Laboratory 
Technician} 
     Services (permission)  
i. {Ultrasound Technologist (read patient record, take ultrasound, analyse 
images)} 
ii. {X-Ray Technician (read patient record, perform x-ray on patient, interpret 
and analyse x-ray result) 
iii. {Clinical Technologist (read patient record, perform medical test, interpret 
result)} 
iv. {Dental Assistant (assist in dental operation, clean decayed teeth, give drug to 
patient)} 
v. {Dental Laboratory Technician (read patient record, performs lab 
analysis)} 
A typical relationship indicating what is obtainable in a 3DGBE for GU, roles and 
permissions relationship is presented in Figure 41. 
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Figure 41: Grid user, roles and services relationship of hierarchical RBAC for 3DGBE  
Whenever a GU specifies his/her domain, the corresponding hierarchy of such a user will 
be instantly verified and produced. The hierarchy is divided into three layers; Hierarchy 1 
(H1) for domain A, Hierarchy 2 (H2) for Domain B and Hierarchy 3 (H3) for Domain C.  
Of all the three domains’ hierarchies, H1 has the highest rating in terms of accessibility to all 
available resources on the grid. Any GU who possesses H1 as his/ her own hierarchy 
implies he is from Domain A and has a capability of accessing resources from any desired 
domain whose services are defined. 
The formulation is such that H1 > H2 >H3. This connotes the superiority of H1 over H2 
and H3. Also, H2 has superiority over H3. With implementation, it implies that H1, with 
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the highest hierarchy, could access all the resources within his/her domain and the domains 
under it, i.e. Domains B and C, with H2 and H3, respectively. 
Similarly, H2 could permit a GU with that hierarchy to access all available information in its 
domain and in the one below it, i.e. in H3. However, H3 permits the GU only to access 
resources within his/her domain alone. This initial access control framework is efficient in a 
3DGBE, as users whose identities are not linked to a specific hierarchy will automatically be 
denied access to resources. 
The prototype of this algorithm was coded and run in a Java Runtime Environment 1.7.0.5 
for the workflows that define the model’s task. A database consisting of the table and 
queries were created. Tables were created for domains, permissions, roles, services and 
users, while the queries were issued on the accessible resources and grid user. 
Implementation reveals that the hierarchical access control adopted for this scenario is 
reliable, dependable and efficient as an access control mechanism within the three domains 
considered. 
Figure 48 (see Appendix D) gives an interface that pops up whenever a GU is successfully 
authenticated as a user in any of the three domains. These requirements have to be fulfilled 
by the GU in order to obtain efficient access to various resources when coming from 
his/her domain.  
In a bid to track the GUs with their respective defined roles as specified and available on 
the grid, Figure 49 (see Appendix D) gives comprehensive information about domain roles 
and their services as spelt out for each user. From the foregoing, it is clear that a cardiologist 
who has his roles defined in Domain A of H1 has the corresponding listed services 
allocated to him. 
Also, a dentist whose domain is B with domain hierarchy H2 can only access the allotted 
services. Attempt to access any other information or services from a domain different from 
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his will result to “rejection or denial of service”, which signifies the efficiency of the access 
control that is put in place. Finally, the same condition is applicable to the ultrasound 
technologist, who has his services defined in Domain C with hierarchy 3 (H3).   
Figure 50 (see Appendix D) gives details about the status of grid users across different 
domains. Some grid users have their requests terminated because, the hierarchies and 
domains specified are not in order with information available from their domains. Those 
whose remarks and status are validated and proceed are given access to authorized 
information concerning them with respect to the domain and its hierarchy. 
As can be seen from Figure 50 (see Appendix D), Saheed Dames, who specified his domain 
as A with hierarchy 1, has his access request terminated simply because he does not belong 
to the domain he specified. The same condition holds for Felix Adams and Kane Peter, 
among others. 
Permission were granted to Kola Serifa (a surgeon) from Domain B , Andy Lui (an 
oncologist) and Nurayhn Wale (a podiatrist) because they specified domains where their 
roles are domiciled. 
To further strengthen the accessibility to different resources and to maintain accuracy and 
precision in information concerning a user, Figure 51 (see Appendix D) gives a summary of 
services belonging to a user (Azeez, Abdula) whose role and services are domiciled in 
Domain B. He can only view this because he has been authorized and authenticated as a 
genuine and authorised user. 
With the access control in place the GUs' access to various resources are well monitored, 
and controlled, and efficiently coordinated. This access control allows authorised access to 
resources across the three domains available on the grid. It easily provides avenue for 
screening out unauthorised users who are not supposed to access a particular resource and 
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permits legal and authorised user to access resources based on their defined roles and 
permissions from their respective hierarchical domains. 
C: Comparison and appraisal 
We identified the links and relationship between problem (access control), intervention 
(solution offered) and outcome (result) and we finally compared the differences, including 
cases selected for their different characteristics. 
D: How to improve the situation 
Repetitive testing was carried out to ensure that the results obtained conform with the 
expected outcome. 
CONCLUSION 
In this chapter, the results obtained for solving the three different grid computing 
challenges (scalability, interoperability and efficient access control in a 3DGBE) were 
discussed. It could be recalled that the research questions set out at the beginning of this 
thesis focus at addressing, the challenges emanating from scalability, interoperability and 
efficient access control in a triple-domain grid-based environment, it is therefore important 
to examine whether these questions have been addressed using the methodology adopted. 
The result obtained via content analysis was presented; this gives room for the summarized 
Table 4 which provides the features of the five security models discussed. 
The second stage of the SSM cycle, witness the presentation of the architecture which 
comprises the phases involved in the designed architecture, the stages of the architecture, 
the algorithm that describes the working relation of the components in the architecture 
presented in stage 1. Also, the stage 2 of 3DGBE architectural framework was presented 
along with the algorithm. 
Consequently, this chapter has fundamentally provided the various results obtained. Some 
of the results obtained in terms of scalability are presented. At the initial stage of evaluation, 
the new architecture (3DGBE) was compared with the existing MAC access control and the 
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result obtained proves the former is more scalable compared to the latter. Other parameters 
such as “average turnaround time” and “the number of grid nodes”; “average turnaround 
time” and “number of grid service requesters” were evaluated and finally the effect of 
“number of grid nodes” was also measured against “throughput” and the “grid nodes”. 
Also, in terms of interoperability, the results have been presented using the four approaches 
adopted in this thesis for addressing this challenge. Interoperability was achieved through 
middleware integration across the three domains as shown in Figure 33. Apart from this, 
interoperability across 3DGBE was attained through the appropriate handling of 
authentication and authorisation between the LSMU and CSMU as presented in stage 1 of 
the architecture that is presented in Figure 22.  
Also, results were presented in terms of the operating system interoperability and federated 
database approach to support the interoperability nature of the architecture. 
This chapter has also presented a comparative evaluation of 3DGBE with other four basic 
access control models. The summary of the result is presented in Table 6. 
 
Finally, the chapter present, using a case scenario, the application of hierarchical RBAC in 
3DGBE. For each of the domains, independent roles and permissions are specified and 
their corresponding hierarchies are also stated. The results to support its evaluation are 
obtained and presented in the Appendix. 
Based on the research question posed, it is therefore apparent that the results obtained have 
answered the questions raised. 
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C h a p t e r  5  
FINDINGS: INTERPRETATION OF THE RESULTS 
INTRODUCTION 
Chapter 4 presents results obtained via the application of SSM. In this chapter, various 
findings from each cycle of the SSM, as well as those obtained from the previously stated 
research questions, will be interpreted. 
Research questions revisited 
The main question addressed was: 
How should information on a grid be secured without compromising the accessibility and 
availability of resources?  
The research question was further divided into two sub-questions as follows:  
• How should interoperability and scalability be put in place to ensure optimal 
utilization of grid computing? 
• How should efficient access control be administered for the entities on the grid in 
order to monitor and control permission to access various resources?  
In order to adequately interpret the results obtained in terms of the research questions 
posed, the relationship among the following items needs to be established: the questions 
posed, the findings, the solution adopted, the effect of causal relationships and outcome 
indicator. 
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How should interoperability and scalability be put in place to ensure optimal 
utilization of grid computing? 
This question is split in two to address interoperability and scalability independently. 
a.  Interoperability 
Findings from the existing literature revealed that the challenges of interoperability were 
addressed using different approaches such policy aggregation, trust, web ontology, modular 
information provider and public key infrastructures. In an attempt to finding solution to this 
challenge, the following strategies were explored in a 3DGBE: middleware aggregation, 
operating system and authentication and authorization between an LSMU and a CSMU, as 
well as federated database approach with MQL as a cross-domain query. Parameters 
identified and used for evaluation ranges from the gLite, Globus and Alchemi for 
middleware aggregation; UNIX, Linux and Windows (operating systems); and different 
applications across the three domains. Dynamic changes enforced on these parameters 
assisted in the efficient measurement and determination of interoperability. The result 
obtained showed the causal relationships provide the desired result as set out in the research 
question. 
b.  Scalability 
A communication model, a framework based on a uniform abstraction and an authorisation 
framework are a few of the approaches used in addressing the concept of scalability in the 
existing literature.  
Various metrics such as the number of accessed resources, time taken, average turnaround 
time, the number of grid node, the number of grid users, the number of service requesters, 
throughput and the number of nodes of the 3DGBE architectural model and algorithms 
were considered and measured against each other. The variation of the metrics used during 
the simulation process of the architecture ensured the verification of scalability. Various 
results obtained proved that the causal relationship effect significantly provide the desired 
result of scalability as set out in the research question. Various results as presented in 
Chapter 4 substantiate this argument. 
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c.  Access control 
How should efficient access control be administered for the entities on the grid in 
order to monitor and control permission to access various resources?  
Semantic web ontologies and traditional access control models such as MAC, DAC, ACL, 
DA and CBSM were found in the existing literatures for controlling access in a grid-based 
environment. The flexible, dynamic and hierarchical RBAC was adopted. In Chapter 4, it 
was clearly shown how this model was used in specifying role, permission and services in 
3DGBE. The implementation of flexible and hierarchical RBAC within the three domains 
of the developed architecture shows that effective access control is obtainable and 
achievable using this access control model. The results obtained prove the effectiveness of 
the design. 
Review of research goals. 
It is worth reminding the reader at this stage of the reason why this research was 
undertaken.  
Having noted scalability, interoperability and access control as great challenges to the 
security of a grid computing system, the research aimed at addressing these challenges. This 
was achieved by first investigating various models relating to the challenges and developing 
a unique model based on the weaknesses noticed in the existing ones. 
Findings of the content analysis with SSM approach. 
To avoid subjectivity (Matveev, 2002) in identifying scalability, interoperability and access 
control as the security challenges to be addressed, this approach uses the repetitive 
approach in clarifying, ascertaining and pinpointing these challenges. The method assisted in 
discovering that 80% of reviewed papers stated that scalability is a serious security challenge 
in grid computing. Findings also revealed that 93% and 87% of the reviewed papers 
identified interoperability and access control respectively, as serious threats to the optimal 
utilization of a grid-based computing.  
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 Findings of the designed framework and algorithms. 
Since the objective of this research is to design an architectural framework to address these 
challenges, SSM was also used to design a workable, efficient and dependable framework 
for addressing them.  
Five different models were initially designed before eventually arrived at the last design. This 
is the beauty of SSM, as it allows for a cyclic approach in addressing each of the challenges 
sequentially. Previous designs were redesigned to circumvent various challenges noted in the 
existing models.  
The final design was compared several times with the existing models and its performance 
evaluation reflects the efficiency and effectiveness of the design.  
Findings of the simulation 
Findings show that SSM is undoubtedly beneficial in carrying out a valid empirical 
evaluation of the design. In order to obtain valid simulation results, we made several 
comparisons in terms of what is to be achieved (target results) and what has been achieved 
in practice. Efforts were also made to vary the causal relationship between various metrics 
adopted for simulation. Findings reveal that as the metrics were compared a number of 
times, more valid results were obtained. It is noted that if the simulation and 
experimentation were not tested several times, consistent, valid results may not have been 
achieved. Of 98% repeated simulated results, 91% remained consistent, which proves the 
evaluation results to be valid.  
Motivation for adopting SSM research methodology 
SSM methodology was considered suitable for this research based on the reasons listed 
below: 
i. It provides an explicit conceptual framework to deal with some of the grid security 
challenges observed. 
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ii. It allows the carrying out of a cyclical-testing approach at different level in order to 
quickly observe the efficiency of the approach adopted. 
iii. It provides a mean of carrying out simulation until a desirable solution is attained.  
iv. It allows one to understand and identify loopholes that may arise from the solution. 
This results from comparing the expected solution with the solution arrived at. 
v. SSM provides opportunity to improve the problem design when the initial solution 
is not effective; 
vi. It provides a comparative analysis of the result obtained in relation to the target 
solution. Hence, it allows one to decide attempt to improve on the obtained result 
or not. 
CONCLUSION 
In this chapter, various interpretations of results have been provided. In the first cycle of 
the SSM, a successful review of related literature was undertaken and the challenges 
addressed in this work were identified. The second stage of the cycle assisted in designing 
an efficient architectural framework and algorithms to handle the challenges identified in the 
first cycle. The cyclical nature of this approach helped to correct and redesign the model 
before arriving at the final framework. The unique feature of the framework lies in its ability 
to repeatedly carry out simulation and various types of experimentation in order to obtain 
dependable and reliable results. 
The case study used in the experiment produced impressive results using this same 
approach. The cyclical nature of SSM has not only yielded good results, but has provided 
confirmed the validity of the results obtained through repetition of the process of 
experimentation and simulation. The next chapter will present the conclusion and 
recommendations. 
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C h a p t e r  6  
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
In the previous chapter, the research results were interpreted. This chapter evaluates the 
contribution of this thesis to the body of knowledge on distributed systems specifically grid 
computing. Also, conclusions are drawn based on the summary of what has been covered in 
the research as presented in the preceding chapters. Recommendations are then made for 
further research. 
Grid computing technologies symbolize a significant and remarkable achievement towards 
the integration as well as aggregation of various network resources for solving complex, 
compute-intensive as well as very large-scale data-intensive applications. These features 
could be achieved at any location whenever a grid user intends to use grid resources.  
Having noted that scalability, interoperability and efficient access control stand as 
stumbling-blocks for the full scale optimization and utilization of this form of distributed 
system, this thesis proposes some novel approaches for handling these security challenges. 
Specifically, a novel architecture and algorithms were developed and a case scenario was 
used. The architecture was evaluated using the Grid Security Services Simulator (which was 
released to the department from France for the purpose of this project), a meta-query 
language and Java Runtime Environment 1.7.0.5 for implementing the workflows that 
define the model’s task. In this chapter, further explanation is given on the thesis 
contributions as well as possible future directions in this area of study. 
The need for research contribution 
This thesis simultaneously describes and solves the three basic security challenges in a grid-
based environment. As evident from various citations provided in this thesis, each of this 
challenges have been independently addressed in various researches but not research has 
ever addressed them collectively as provided in this thesis. 
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This thesis presents a novel architecture christened as triple-domain grid-based environment 
(3DGBE). This unique architecture is divided into two different stages with each stage has 
two phases. The phases of the architecture are presented Figure 21 while both stage 1 and 2 
of the architecture are presented in Figure 22 and 25 respectively. The choice of a 3DGBE 
is basically to create and establish competition among the various entities (users and 
resources) on the grid.  
Furthermore, this thesis presents algorithms for both stages 1 and 2 (see algorithms 1 and 2) 
which provide comprehensive working relation of components of the architecture of Figure 
22 as well as the working scenario of the architecture in Figure 25. The architecture has 
been successfully implemented using G3S. 
This thesis provides four approaches for solving challenges emanating from interoperability. 
This approach of solving interoperability in a 3DGBE could be regarded as four-in-one 
approach. This is another unique contribution that needs emphasis. The thesis adopts grid 
middleware integration across the three domains as shown in Figure 33.  
This approach is novel provides a successful interoperability across the three domains 
established. This thesis clearly presents how appropriate handling of authentication and 
authorization between the LSMU and CSMU in a 3DGBE has yielded interoperability. It is 
evident from the explanation on pages 80-81 how this was achieved. The third approach 
used in this category is operating system interoperability whose explanation is detailed on 
pages 81-83. Finally, different database applications were created across the three domains 
and meta-queries were issued in order to obtain desirable information across the three 
domain. 
Another unique contribution of this research work to the body of knowledge lies in its 
adoption of hierarchical RBAC for providing efficient access control across the three 
domains. Since various grid users are involved and each of the GU could access resources 
anywhere, this this provides hierarchies for each user based on his domain and this was used 
as key for accessing resources. Each of the domains has a set of defined roles, permissions 
and their specified hierarchies. This aspect was evaluated using a case scenario of e-health. 
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The research presents a critical and extensive evaluation of five basic security models vis-à-
vis their mode of implementations and operations, their strengths and their weaknesses. 
This evaluation has provided a clear-cut as to the best of the models suitable for the project. 
This thesis also presents unique approach for determining security rate (SR) across the three 
domain considered by taking into consideration “Approv” , “Rep” and “Assess” for all the 
entities in the 3DGBE. 
 
All in all, the project is unique in simultaneously addressing three security challenges by 
using Grid Security Services Simulator (G3S), Java Runtime Environment 1.7.0.5 and a 
meta-query language. 
Based on the contribution stated above, the need to further explain various applications of 
these challenges to aspect of human is indeed important. 
A well-researched project, particularly a doctoral thesis, should provide a reasonable level of 
research contribution by supporting the advancement and enhancement of human 
knowledge by adding something unique, novel and original to the body of knowledge          
( Stella, 1984).  
This can be attained by critically observing what problem(s) are currently being addressed 
and what type of results have been obtained after investigating these problems. Empirical 
and judgmental observation may spur research and identify new problems that are different 
from previous research (Baniassad & Clarke, 2004).  
According to Webster's Dictionary, knowledge is "the ideas or understandings which an entity 
possesses that are used to take effective action to achieve the entity's goal(s). This knowledge is specific to the 
entity which created it." (Steve, 2009:23) 
For knowledge to be established, new theories need to be formulated or existing ones 
manipulated. The development of a new theory often results from research question being 
posed to address gaps existing in the reviewed literature ( Sanga & Venter, 2010).  
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Table 8: Summary of research contributions 
Category Typical Activity Remarks 
Problem 
identification 
Identified three grid security problems, i.e. 
(scalability, interoperability and access control) 
Achieved through SSM (review 
of conference and journal 
papers)  
Theoretical 
analysis 
Provided novel mathematical definitions and 
assumptions to aid simulation 
Definitions of DSRV, SRV, 
Rep etc 
Design Designed a novel architectural framework for 
3DGBE with algorithms 
Tested and evaluated 
Comparison Compared several theoretical models, system 
designs, or implementations in a novel way 
Achieved 
Implementation Implemented the designed system for the first 
time using G3S, MQL as “cross-domain” 
queries and Java Runtime Environment 1.7.0.5 
Achieved 
Empirical 
analysis 
Studied the performance of an implemented 
system in a novel way by observing and 
comparing results with the stated objectives 
and research questions.  
Effective and efficient 
Application of 
the project 
It has significance and numerous industrial and 
academic applications. 
SAgrid, CHPC, Search for 
Extraterrestrial Intelligence 
(SETI), Indiana Grid 
Folding@home (Stanford 
University's chemistry 
department) and the military 
 
The research identified various gaps in the literature. In this work, three basic security 
challenges were identified as forces militating against the full optimisation of grid 
computing. 
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Empiricism, novelty, acceptability to the research community (Balsley, 1970), disciplinary 
relevance and generalizability are considered as ingredients for regarding and classifying 
research as contributing to a body of knowledge (Burrel & Toyama, 2009).  
Grid computing is a new area of research and, this research project is the first such project 
carried out in this area of computing in the department at the University of the Western 
Cape. The approach used is purely that of experimental computer science, which has to do 
with building and developing architectural framework and algorithms. This project has led 
to a couple of publications in leading computer science journals and presentations at 
Department of Higher Education and Training approved conferences. 
Some of the research work have been published in peer-reviewed articles and presented at 
both national and in international conferences. (See pages ix – x). To further prove the 
acceptability of this research work, part of the work has been requested by Prof. Von Solms 
Rossouw of Nelson Mandela Metropolitan University who is the editor of the South 
African Institute for Electrical Engineers for further review and possible consideration for 
publication. The research contributions are summarized in Table 8. 
Scope and limitations of the research 
The research focused on three basic security challenges that hampered the full utilisation of 
grid computing. The implementation of the designed framework was divided into three 
areas: implementations for scalability, interoperability and efficient access control. The 
results obtained in this project were achieved using three different approaches. The results 
for scalability were obtained with the use of a simulator (grid security services simulator), 
those on interoperability were arrived at using Java Runtime Environment 1.7.0.5, meta-
query language (MQL) for “cross-domain” queries and experimentation, while the third 
phase (access control) of the results were achieved with the use of a case scenario using Java 
Runtime Environment 1.7.0.5 for its implementation. The results obtained so far have 
convincingly answered the research questions posed in Chapter 1 of the thesis. 
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As stated earlier, many challenges have faced grid computing since it came into existence. 
Three of them have been successfully addressed in this work. In other words, other 
challenges affecting grid computing such as grid scheduling, pricing, grid management, grid 
coordination and many others are beyond the scope of this work, hence they are not 
addressed in this work but deserve urgent attention. 
The cyclical nature of the simulation and various experiments conducted is time consuming, 
coupled with the fact that it is a nascent area of research endeavour. All in all, the objectives 
of the project have been achieved, although, there is a need for implementation on a real-
life grid. 
Recommendations and future work 
It is evident from the thesis that all the challenges addressed are of essence and cannot be 
ignored either by security architects or security experts. However, since the architectural 
models were not implemented in a real grid environment, it therefore advisable to do so in 
order to test their applicability in the real world. 
This thesis suggests some future directions to further solve other challenges hampering the 
full-scale adoption and utilization of grid computing. The future directions are related to the 
following key functionalities of grids, i.e. resource management, data management, 
scheduling, resource integration, coordination, pricing and auditing, implementation on a 
real grid testbeds, and extension of implementation to other forms of distributed systems. 
Another interesting area of grid that deserves urgent attention is negotiation and 
coordination of multiple resources by various organisations. For example, in the case of 
conserving and reserving network bandwidth, a network engineer is required to emphasis 
and focus on network management issues like providing and establishing a dependable and 
guaranteed handling traffic congestion mechanism and end-to-end path for resources.  
The study about scalability, interoperability and efficient access control were carried out 
through simulation, java implementations, case scenario and meta-query language. The next 
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stage is to convert this research study into a real life implementation, i.e. by implementing 
them as a prototype on a real grid testbeds. 
Apart from grid computing, there are other forms of distributed system that are also facing 
challenges addressed in this thesis. Specifically, cloud computing, peer to peer system and 
cluster computing also deserve attention while implementing these challenges.   
Finally, there is a strong believe that real life implementation of these three challenges will 
go a long at addressing industrial and academe problems being faced through them. 
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Appendices 
APPENDIX A:  
Findings of the content analysis 
 
Access Control List (ACL) 
Implementation  
ACL remains the earliest, oldest as well as the most basic form of access control (Stone, 
2003). It became prominent in the early 70s to constrain access to data and files on 
distributed systems (Roure, Baker, Nicholas, Jennings, & Shadbolt, 2002) due to the 
emergence of multi user operating systems. The functioning of ACL is simple: each of the 
resources on the system has a corresponding list of entities that may access the resource and 
the associated actions that such an entity can perform on the resource.  
For example, a data structure can hold a list of authorized users that may access a particular 
file on the file system.  A flag (Levine, 2002.) specifies whether a user can read, execute, 
modify, delete or write a file or perform some combination of two or more operations on 
the file (Foster I. , Kesselman, Tsudik, & Tuecke, 1998).  
Thus an ACL, is a list of genuine and authorized users as well as their rights and privileges 
for each of the resources in a virtual organization (Houmb., Georg, France, & Matheson, 
2004). 
The access control that governs the access to resources in domain A (see Figure 42) can be 
expressed as follows: 
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ACL (RA) = [(UC, [opA1, opA2, opA3……..]), (UD, [opA5, opA6, opA7…….])…..] 
Where opA1…..opA7 are operations that are allowed in domain A. RA are the resources in 
domain and UC and UD are the number of users in domain C and D respectively. 
Strengths of ACL 
Three main strengths of the ACL were identified, (using content analysis). They include the 
following: 
 It provides a direct and straightforward means of denying or granting access for 
specific group of users. This is achieved by verifying the Access Control List to 
know whether a group is in the list or not.  
 
Figure 42: Multiple-domain resource sharing environment  
 ACL allows simplicity and avoids complexity in granting access to the user to 
resources ( Hu, Ferraiolo, & Kuhn, 2006) 
 Some commercial operating systems such as Microsoft & Windows XP and 
Windows 2007 employ ACL for their built-in access control 
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Weaknesses of ACL 
The weakness of ACL include lack of interoperability, it is static and vulnerability:  
 Lack of interoperability. The various domains and organisations which are involved 
in a virtual organisation (VO) need to agree on what permission and access 
framework to be implemented. This is to be done at an advance stage so that each 
domain administrator can easily enforce the same policy.  However, it might be 
difficult for organisations to agree on all policies. 
 ACL is static. The ACL is strictly tied to resources and does not allow for scalability. 
The individual’s user account is managed by the domain administrator and is 
managed for each resource. Whenever a user joins or leaves the grid, the domain 
administrator in each of the VO’s will have to update the ACL of the resource by 
deleting the access of the user or adding rights to the resource for the user.  
 ACL is very vulnerable to errors. Since the grid is well known for its dynamic 
nature, the implementation of an ACL on each individual domain poses a great 
challenge. At any time when a user is withdrawn from a project, the domain 
administrator will have to go through each of the resources to remove all the access 
privileges granted to such a user. When revoking access rights, some of the 
privileges may be overlooked.  
Mandatory access control (MAC) 
This type of access control policy allows decisions to be made over and above the directive 
and control of each of the resource’s owner. There is a central authority that decides and 
determines which resources and information should be accessed by whom (agent) and the 
access rights of the user cannot be manipulated or altered (Imine, Cherif, & Rusinowitch, 
2009). This security model allows every user and object to be assigned a label called a 
sensitivity label, which comprises compartments and a level of secrecy (Azeez, Iyamu, & 
Venter, 2011). 
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Four tiers of security levels are considered in the following order: TOPSECRET > 
SECRET > CONFIDENTIAL >UNCLASSIFIED (Haidar, 2002).  
SECRET is considered to be the sensitivity label for the logistics file while SECRET implies 
the security level. Also, the sensitivity label of a file for user is TOPSECRET where 
TOPSECRET indicates the security level. 
Mandatory access control is based on two main principles as formulated and stated by ( 
Pedayachee, 2009).They are: 
• There is no read-up: This implies that a grid user running an application at “Secret” 
level would not be permitted to access (read, write, delete) any file labelled “Top 
Secret”. This is because Top Secret>Secret in the security hierarchy. A subject is 
only allowed to read a dominated object in an access class. 
• There is no write-down: In this case, whenever a grid user runs a process labelled 
“Secret” such a user should not be allowed to access (write) any file tagged 
“Confidential”. A subject can only write to objects that have access dominating that 
of the subject. This rule is called the “*-property” 
Strengths of MAC 
Four main strengths of the MAC were identified:   
 The decision about the access control policy is taken by the central authority hence; 
each grid user cannot alter or change the access rights and privileges on his own 
 It adopts a labelling or tagging mechanism with a set of interfaces to enforce 
protection decision. For example, a grid user running a process at the “secret “ level 
will be disallowed from accessing file tagged “Top Secret”. This is termed as “simple 
security rule”  
 It provides a greater and reliable level of protection to the resources when 
compared to access control list model 
 
 
 
 
Appendices  132 
 
 
 
 It does not subscribe to illegal flow of information which occurs when a message is 
transmitted from one end to the other, contradictory to information flow security 
policy (Samaratim, Bertino, Ciampichetti, & Jajod, 2007). 
Mandatory access control is known for its numerous advantages (Pfleeger, 1997) especially 
when compared with discretionary access control, however the model still has many 
deficiencies (Russell & Gangemi, 1991).  
Weaknesses of MAC 
 Information downgrading: this occurs when information is transferred from a 
higher security level to a lower level 
 Adopting a MAC model may lead to a large chunk of the operating system being 
incorporated into the Trusted Computing Base (TCB) 
 MAC creates a large semantic gap between the access control of programming 
languages and the operating systems. Hence languages like java virtual machine 
(JVM) cannot implement mandatory access control ( Pedayachee, 2009). 
The adoption and implementation of MAC models were prevalent in military applications, 
such as role specification for the military while in a battle field. According to Anderson 
(2001), the model is presently being adopted in systems that require intricate relationships 
among the various entities, for example in medical data applications which involve sensitive 
data as well as e-business applications which require stringent privacy control mechanisms 
(Samaratim, Bertino, Ciampichetti, & Jajod, 2007). 
Distributed Authorization Model (DAM) 
This is considered to be a user-centered authorization oriented model (Kealey & Protheroe, 
1996). The motive behind this security model is that each of the domains participating in 
the virtual organization project has a representative or proxy, tasked with the responsibility 
of translating a global credential to a local one. Therefore, each of the grid users is expected 
 
 
 
 
Appendices  133 
 
 
 
to possess his/her account from his immediate administrative domain (McCroskey & 
Richmond, 1990). However, the access right of each of the users is managed and decided 
on by the virtual organization domains.  Before any access can be granted to a resource on 
the grid, a mapping of the credentials of the user’s administrative domain must be 
compared with that of the resource domain.  
Consider Figure 1, where the decision of the access privileges of user in domain C (UC)  to 
access resource of domain D (R.D) is ascertained and achieved through mapping of UC’s 
identity from domain C (i.e Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) (Price, 2003) to a local account 
in administrative domain D (i.e Operating System 2 (OS2)). As a result of the mapping of 
these two different domains, U.C can easily access RD as a local and immediate user in 
domain D. Also, domain D can easily apply its domain security policy. This security solution 
has been adopted by various popular grid projects like Unicore and Globus (Haidar, 2002). 
Strengths of DAM 
 The local site director and administrator are in full control of their resources. 
 It is transparent since both the passwords and usernames are provided with the 
subject’s name clearly written on the certificate. Hence it is very easy to find 
someone who carries out an unauthorized action on a particular resource. 
 Changes in the security framework are not required in the local domain. The 
security protocol can be established with role base access control (RBAC) 
mechanisms. 
Weaknesses of DAM 
 Each of the domains on the grid depend directly on the central operation; 
 User’s access rights and privileges are controlled , managed and monitored on each 
virtual organisation (VO) sites (Haidar, 2002); 
 Problem of scalability: grid user should have local accounts in all the VO sites where 
he should access resources. Hence, the administrator will have to update a user’s 
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account and schedule its access right whenever a new grid user is added or when he 
has his duty reviewed; 
 Problem of inconsistency: deleting user’s access right is complex and cumbersome.  
All the system administrators must be well informed should in case a grid user change or 
when there is a change in policy. If anyone of the VO administrators is not acquainted, 
there will be inconsistency in the policy. 
The functioning of DAM explained 
Consider Figure 43 and Figure 44 where two domains (with different security policies and 
protocols) are involved; J and K. When a user from either domain requests to access a 
resource from the other domain, the user will have to follow the security requirements of 
that domain before access will be granted.  If the user is unable to do so, access will be 
denied. Figure 43 shows identity mapping using ACL. Anytime a user in domain J wants to 
access resource in domain K (R.K), the following situations hold: 
 User in domain J (UJ) sends across through stage 1, his X509 (ITU-T  approved 
standard for specifying what information goes into a certificate and clearly explains its 
written format) certificate to resource in domain K. This contains his subject name as 
in stage 2. The resource confirms the validity of the certificate to know whether there is 
a private key with the sender which tallies to the public key of the certificate 
 If the above (authentication) succeeds, the subject name is extracted (SN. UJ) from the 
certificate as shown in 3. 
 The resource is thereafter compares the subject name to various entries already 
available in the mapping database at phase 4. The feedback could either be True 
(authorised) or false (not authorised) 
 If the feedback is false (not authorised), it implies that there is no match and that the 
user is not allowed to access the resource 
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 But if the feedback is True (authorised), both the password and the user name that are 
corresponding to subject name from the database are fetched by the resource as 
appears in stage 5. At this stage, the user can become accessible to resource as a local 
(grid user) in domain K..  
In Figure 44 the process of identity mapping using RBAC in a distributed authorisation is 
shown. All conditions mentioned under identity mapping using ACL Figure 42 hold, except 
that in stage two, the resource has to extract the subject name (SN, UJ) from the certificate 
based on the role specified for the user 
Figure 43: Process of identity mapping using Access Control List 
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Figure 44: Process of identity mapping using role based access control  
Once this is achieved and established, the grid user can access resources as a local user in 
domain K as if he or she is a local user. 
Context Based Security Model (CBSM) 
This is a new security model designed to handle security challenge emanating from the high 
mobility of pervasive computing and different devices used in these types of environment 
(Etalle & Winsborough, 2007). This model handles context as the most important and basic 
principle in policy enforcement and specification. The context based security model 
presents the contexts of the various security policies and how they are associated as well as 
which agents may operate within these policies. It specifies the action which must be carried 
out and those that are forbidden on resources in contexts.  It associates different agents 
with the context dynamically (Ferreira, et al., 2006). 
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Figure 45: Context-based Security Policy (Pretschner, Hilty, Schutz, Schaefer, & Walter, 2008). 
This security model makes use of contextual graphs to specify various security policies.  It is 
used as a tool which eases security specification for complex domains with various 
heterogeneous devises and services (Geogiev & Georgiev, 2001). The application and 
exploitation of context for merging security policies eases and simplifies access control 
management policies by enhancing the reuse of policy specification and by simplifying 
complexities of policy update and revocation (Frey, Tannenbaum, Foster, & Livny, 2001). 
This security policy is unique in the sense that it allows policy specifications and 
enforcement as well as fine-grained access control (D' Arcy & Hovav, 2007). 
Security context can be defined as the information gathered from the application and the 
user’s environments considered to be very important and useful to the security of both the 
application and user ( Gouglidis & Mavridis, 2009). To build a security context, some 
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contextual information may be used, such as user’s location, his preference, user’s identity, 
information sensitivity etc. 
Security policy on the other hand is a specification that states clearly and precisely the 
authorized practices with all the denials for each user in each context.  
Figure 42 shows a conceptual model of a context based security policy defined as a union of 
actions in a grid based environment and context. The pervasive grid environment is firstly 
controlled and monitored with a particular configuration of the security policy in initial 
context (Patrick & Ghita, 2004). This context is dynamically changing in request to variation 
in the environment. The security policy should adjust itself to any new context so as to 
bridge and fill the breaches that might be available by the new context ( Baktash, Karimi, 
Meybodi, & Bouyer, 2010). When a context is finally established in the environment, then 
appropriate action follows that is when an authorized user approaches a particular security 
context, such context will automatically be associated with the corresponding action. 
Context can be any relevant information like the user’s location, the features of the 
underlying device and many others (Dewan, Grundin, & Horvitz, 2007). Despite numerous 
benefits of this security model, it is new and requires more testing to confirm its reliability in 
a grid based environment.  
Strengths of CBSM 
 It caters for adequate and efficient security challenges in a pervasive grid based  
applications and environment 
 It offers a security solution based on the explicit specification on the context 
(situation) of use of the system 
 It conveniently implements security policy in an environment where its policies  
are considered static 
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Weaknesses of CBSM 
 CBSM is new and its application has not been adequately explored hence its 
efficiency and reliability cannot be fully guaranteed 
 It is neither flexible nor interoperable since its application is limited to finding a 
security solution to a pervasive computing environment.  
 It has limited areas of application 
Role based access control (RBAC) 
The major problem with some of the previously explained security models is administering 
individuals with roles.  To solve this anomaly, RBAC authorization model could be adopted. 
Role based access control came into existence in the early 90s as a form of security model 
for enforcing and managing security policies in a virtual organisation (Herath & Rao, 2009).  
RBAC has a focus on the users and the jobs they perform within a given organisation. 
Hence, it is useful and appropriate for a dynamic and large-scale environment such as the 
grid. The main opinion of RBAC is that roles are associated with permissions (Imine, 
Cherif, & Rusinowitch, 2009) and users are assigned appropriate roles or duties. With 
RBAC model, only genuine and authorized users are permitted to access various resources 
on the grid. This provides simplicity for authorization management when providing chance 
for dynamism in enforcing and specifying certain enterprise security policies (Mao, Li, Chen, 
& Jiang, 2009). 
Figure 46 reveals the relationships among different users (A, B, C, D,E, F, etc.), different 
roles (R1, R2, R3, R4, R5, R6,etc.) and permissions (P1, P2, P3, P4, P5, P6, etc.) in a role 
based access control model. Each user can be assigned to a role (or several roles) and a role 
can be assigned to many users as shown in the Figure 46. In essence, there are one-to-one, 
many-to-one and one-to-many relationships between role and user. Each user has many or 
one permission and likewise permissions could be associated and assigned to just one or 
many roles according to the security policy. Finally, T1, T2, T3, T4, T5, T6, etc., represent 
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database of resources or data, and its access to the grid. Permission is either area right or a 
write right on the grid. 
Strengths of the RBAC model 
 Reduction in both administrative complexity and cost.  
With role based access control model, the local domain administrator can provide 
permissions to roles (rather than individuals), according to local and global policies ( 
Chadwick & Otenko, 2002). 
  RBAC (UA) = [Dom1, Role1), (Dom2, Role2).....] ……………………..equation 1 
The above implies that applying RBAC for user A specifies or defines Role1 for Domain 1 
and Role 2 for Domain 2. 
  Permission (Dom1, Role1) = [Opr11 (Writing), Opr12 (deleting), Opr13 
(updating).....]…………………………………………………………………equation 2  
The above means specified permissions for Domain 1 and Role1 are given as operation11 
(Writing), operation12 (deleting) and operation13 (updating) to be carried out. 
 Operational consistency 
Each role can be associated with a position and as such, a set of operations can be 
allowed. For example, three lecturers with similar roles will have the same 
permissions (Haidar, 2002). 
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Figure 46: User-Role-Permission mapping in a flexible RBAC 
 RBAC can incorporate other models such as MAC and DAC ( Pedayachee, 2009). 
 RBAC can be used with various applications that are interoperable, flexible and 
scalable.  
Weaknesses of the RBAC model 
 With RBAC, allocation of files and servers may not be compatible with any 
establishment structure that needs and requires users to  focus on empirical matters 
like payment of bills and opening of account 
 It is too difficult and costly to implement and achieve the least privilege condition 
since it is complex to tailor access based on different constraints and attributes 
 User access to resources are only regulated mainly on the basis of role (the activities 
the users perform) and thus derecognize some other important indices for accessing 
resources 
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Figure 47: Relationship of elements in a flexible RBAC  
 (Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/file:rbac.jpg) 
The formal specification, definition and explanation of individual elements in a flexible 
RBAC are shown in Figure 47.  The abbreviations are explained as follows: The star (*) sign 
in Figure 47implies many-to-many relationship between the entities. 
Table 9: Description of elements in a flexible rbac 
Abbreviation Name Description 
S Subject A person or agent involved 
R Role Job definition or specification 
P Permissions It specifies a mode of accessing a resource 
SE Session  A mapping of Subject (S), Role (R), and / or 
Permission (P) 
SA Subject assignment Assigns a subject to a role 
RH Role Hierarchy  The position / level of a role  
PA Permission Assignment Gives permission to a role 
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In set theory notation the relationships are shown as follows: 
:   This is a many to many permission to role assignment relation. 
     This is a many to many subject to role assignment relation. 
 :   This is a partial order on R referred to as role dominance relation or 
role hierarchy.  
RBAC Framework model 
RBAC framework model divides RBAC into four main categories: core RBAC, hierarchical 
RBAC, static separation of duty relation and dynamic separation of duty relations. The 
function of each of the categories is presented in Table 10 
Table 10: RBAC Framework model 
Category  Function  
Core RBAC 
 
• Introduces the concept of role activation as part of a user’s 
session within a computer system. 
• Required in any RBAC system, but the other components are 
independent of each other and may be implemented separately.  
 
Hierarchical RBAC 
 
• Relations for supporting role hierarchies (inheritance among roles) 
 
Static Separation of 
Duty Relations 
 
• Adds exclusivity relations among roles w.r.t. user assignments 
• Potential for inconsistencies w.r.t. static separation of duty 
relations and inheritance relations of a role hierarchy 
• Defines relations in both the presence and absence of role 
hierarchies.  
 
Dynamic Separation 
of Duty Relations 
 
• Exclusivity relations w.r.t. roles that are activated as part of a 
user’s session 
  
 
 
 
 
Appendices  144 
 
 
 
APPENDIX B 
Tables containing information for databases of university, hospital and banking  
Table 11: University database for domain A 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 12: University database for domain A (Continued from Table 10) 
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Table 13: University database for domain A (Continued from table 11) 
 
Table 14: University database for domain A (Continued from Table 12) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 15: Hospital database for domain B 
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Table 16: Hospital database for domain B (Continued from Table 14) 
 
Table 17: Hospital database for domain B (Continued from Table 15) 
 
Table 18: Banking database for domain C 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 19: Banking database for domain C (Continued from Table 17) 
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APPENDIX C 
Report of cross domain query of Figure 41 for domains A and B 
Domain A:and B ( University database and Hospital database) 
ID No 
Student 
NO 
Surname 
First 
name 
Initial DOB Passport No Nationality Residential Area Gender 
MArital 
status 
Home language Postal Address Tel no Email 
1000 3008814 Azeez Nureni N.A 1978/07/10 QOO12345 Nigerian Belhar Male Married Yoruba Dept of Computer Science 0738991735 nurayhn@yahoo.ca 
1001 3066278 Adewale Abiola M.D 1980/04/08 RE0047476 Namibia DOS Female Single Shaulli Department of Maths 0749988452 wale@gmail.com 
1200 2340078 Abidoye Philip P.O 1976/06/09 WE345678 Nigerian HPR Male Married Yoruba Dept of Computer Science 0713456878 abidoye.ade@gmail.com 
1220 2357858 Scholtz Josue S.J 1981/04/05 VB7878784 Ghana Cassinga Male Single Huoity Department of Regious Studies 021(0)67476 schortz@gmail.com 
1260 3400993 Magnuth Henry H.M 1975/06/09 FD8785758 Cameroun SANTOS Female Married Gonghil Department of Geology 0746767790 henry@gmail.com 
1320 3476002 Andy Liu X.L 1984/02/09 RE7878784 China HPR Male Single Chineese Dept of Computer Science 0756355252 andy@gmial.com 
1400 3455266 Achmed Imran I.A 1986/02/09 UD5785785 South Africa Cassinga Female Single Africaans Dept of Computer Science 0723453545 imran@gmail.com 
1523 2004556 Jonathan Magnus I.M 1974/07/10 TY8989956 Congo RC FBR Male Single Samdaba Department of Physics 021(0)56156 hjuy@gmail 
Disability 
Next of 
kin 
Examination 
Authority 
School 
Last school year 
status 
Passport expiry 
date 
permit number 
permit 
type 
Medical aid name Validity of medical aid postal code course department 
None Abdul 
Waahid 
WAEC UWC, RSA Ede 2014 23KIO456 Study INGWE March, 2013 7535 PhD Computer Science 
None Shola GRADE 2 UWC, RSA Somekia 2013 76HG6879 Study INGWE Dec., 2012 7887 Masters Mathematics 
None Ademola SSCE UWC, RSA Ilesha 2014 45UYO045 Study MOMENTUM April, 2013 7556 PhD Computer Science 
Astigmatism Jerry GRADE10 UWC, RSA Hausa 2015 67DA9975 Study MAKOTI Nov., 2012 7535 Masters Religious studies 
None Mercy GRADE 4 UWC, RSA Igbo 2013 87FG12235 Study MALCOR 2014 6778 PhD Geology 
None Xium MATRIC2003 UWC, RSA Njoku Lee 2013 66UYO041 Study NETCARE 2013 7534 PhD Biochemistry 
None Nabila GRADE 10 UWC, RSA Cape Town Not Applicable Not Applicable Not 
Applicable 
MEDIMED Not Applicable 6573 Honours Computer Science 
Hearing Joy GRADE 10 UWC, RSA Poskia 2015 67KIO7834 Study INGWE March, 2015 5534 Masters Philosophy 
 
Patient_ID File No Surname First name Patient_Condition Date_Of_Admission Insurance_Num Province 
Admission 
Unit 
Employment status 
Patient 
Account 
Health 
provider 
Age BloodGroup Genotype Race 
1000 0031 Azeez Nureni Medical Checkup 2012/09/04 009 The Western Cape Out-
Patient 
Full-time Position 001WF INGWE 23 A AA BLACK 
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APPENDIX C 
Report of cross domain query of Figure 41 for domains A and B 
Domain A:and B ( University database and Hospital database) 
ID No 
Student 
NO 
Surname 
First 
name 
Initial DOB Passport No Nationality Residential Area Gender 
MArital 
status 
Home language Postal Address Tel no Email 
1001 0023 Adewale Abiola Blood Test 2012/09/09 005 The Free State Medical 
Lab 
Part-time Position 682FD INGWE 28 O SC INDIA 
1200 0045 Abidoye Philip Eye problem 2012/06/04 007 Eastern Cape Optometry Full-time Position 985TY MOMENTUM 34 B AS COLOURED 
1220 0013 Scholtz Josue Car accident 2011/09/01 004 KwaZulu-Natal Emergency Part-time Position 242DS MAKOTI 25 B AA BLACK 
1260 0011 Magnuth Henry Head injury 2012/03/06 006 Mpumalanga Emergency Part-time Position 909ED MALCOR 32 A AC WHITE 
1320 0067 Andy Liu Hearing problem 2012/03/06 003 Northern Cape Out-
Patient 
Part-time Position 686YU NETCARE 27 O AA INDIA 
1400 0012 Achmed Imran Back Pain and X-
ray 
2011/09/04 002 Limpopo Radiology Full-time Position 345TR MEDIMED 29 AB SS BLACK 
1523 0056 Jonathan Magnus Pregnancy 2012/01/02 008 Cape Town Ante natal Full-time Position 788HG INGWE 20 AB AC WHITE 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendices  149 
 
 
 
Cross-domain queries reports 
B. Report of cross domain query of Figure 42 for domains A and C 
Domain A and C:(Hospital Database and Banking databases) 
Patient_ID File No Surname First name Patient_Condition Date_Of_Admission Insurance_Num Province 
Admission 
Unit 
Employment 
status 
Patient 
Account 
Health 
provider 
Age BloodGroup Genotype Race 
1000 0031 Azeez Nureni Medical Checkup 2012/09/04 009 The Western Cape Out-Patient Full-time Position 001WF INGWE 23 A AA BLACK 
1001 0023 Adewale Abiola Blood Test 2012/09/09 005 The Free State Medical Lab Part-time Position 682FD INGWE 28 O SC INDIA 
1200 0045 Abidoye Philip Eye problem 2012/06/04 007 Eastern Cape Optometry Full-time Position 985TY MOMENTUM 34 B AS COLOURED 
1220 0013 Scholtz Josue Car accident 2011/09/01 004 KwaZulu-Natal Emergency Part-time Position 242DS MAKOTI 25 B AA BLACK 
1260 0011 Magnuth Henry Head injury 2012/03/06 006 Mpumalanga Emergency Part-time Position 909ED MALCOR 32 A AC WHITE 
1320 0067 Andy Liu Hearing problem 2012/03/06 003 Northern Cape Out-Patient Part-time Position 686YU NETCARE 27 O AA INDIA 
1400 0012 Achmed Imran Back Pain and X-
ray 
2011/09/04 002 Limpopo Radiology Full-time Position 345TR MEDIMED 29 AB SS BLACK 
1523 0056 Jonathan Magnus Pregnancy 2012/01/02 008 Cape Town Ante natal Full-time Position 788HG INGWE 20 AB AC WHITE 
 
ID_NO 
Customer 
Name 
service 
code 
Account ID Current balance 
Initial Date of 
Transaction 
Type of Account Tax_ID 
1000 Azeez, N.A FD9989 45454599XX R 56.5XX Jan 16, 2012 Saving 0011 
1001 Adewale, M.D NH7676 86868612XX R 129XX June 12, 2012 Cheque 0023 
1200 Abidoye, P.O YU7878 57757577XX R 100XX March 10, 2012 Cheque 0056 
1220 Scholtz, S.J YE85852 67676768XX R 451XX April 10, 2012 Cheque 0057 
1260 Magnuth, H.M BG2323 13243535XX R 000XX Aug 10., 2012 Saving 0078 
1320 Andy, X.L HJ7880 47747744XX R 562XX Feb 19, 2012 Saving 0085 
1400 Achmed , I.A WE4545 67677676XX R 00.7XX Dec 18, 2011 Saving 0045 
1523 Jonathan, I.M QW576 56565655XX R 06.7XX Sept 15, 2012 Cheque 0034 
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Domain A:University Database 
ID No Surname Nationality 
1000 Azeez Nigerian 
1001 Adewale Namibia 
1200 Abidoye Nigerian 
1220 Scholtz Ghana 
1260 Magnuth Cameroun 
1320 Andy China 
1400 Achmed South Africa 
1523 Jonathan Congo RC 
Domain B: Hospital Database 
File_No Patient_Condition Patient_Account Age 
0031 Medical Checkup 001WF 23 
0023 Blood Test 682FD 28 
0045 Eye problem 985TY 34 
0013 Car accident 242DS 25 
0011 Head injury 909ED 32 
0067 Hearing problem 686YU 27 
0012 Back Pain and X-ray 345TR 29 
0056 Pregnancy 788HG 20 
Domain C: Banking Database 
service code Account_ID Tax_ID 
FD9989 45454599XX 0011 
NH7676 86868612XX 0023 
YU7878 57757577XX 0056 
YE85852 67676768XX 0057 
BG2323 13243535XX 0078 
HJ7880 47747744XX 0085 
WE4545 67677676XX 0045 
QW576 56565655XX 0034 
 
C.  Report of cross domain query of Figure 43 for domains A, B and C 
 
ID No Surname Nationality File_No Patient_Condition Patient_Account Age service code Account_ID Tax_ID 
1000 Azeez Nigerian 0031 Medical Checkup 001WF 23 FD9989 45454599XX 0011 
1001 Adewale Namibia 0023 Blood Test 682FD 28 NH7676 86868612XX 0023 
1200 Abidoye Nigerian 0045 Eye problem 985TY 34 YU7878 57757577XX 0056 
1220 Scholtz Ghana 0013 Car accident 242DS 25 YE85852 67676768XX 0057 
1260 Magnuth Cameroun 0011 Head injury 909ED 32 BG2323 13243535XX 0078 
1320 Andy China 0067 Hearing problem 686YU 27 HJ7880 47747744XX 0085 
1400 Achmed South Africa 0012 Back Pain and X-ray 345TR 29 WE4545 67677676XX 0045 
1523 Jonathan Congo RC 0056 Pregnancy 788HG 20 QW576 56565655XX 0034 
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APPENDIX D 
Report on access control  
 
 Figure 48:  Grid user administrative task options 
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 Figure 49:  Available roles and services  
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Figure 50: Grid users’ roles, domain hierarchy and their access status. 
ÏÏ  
¼¼Ï        Your choice_ 4 
ÏÏ§Ï_ displayAllUserQuery()... 
ÏÏ§Ï 
ÏÏ§Ï| DomainID  | DomainHeirachy | Name     | Surname | Role                     | Remarks    | Status     | 
ÏÏ§Ï========================================================================================================= 
ÏÏ§Ï 
ÏÏ§Ï| A         | 1              | Saheed   | Dames   | Cardiologist             | invalid    | terminate  | 
ÏÏ§Ï| B         | 2              | James    | Kolade  | Dentist                  | valid      | proceed    | 
ÏÏ§Ï| C         | 3              | Felix    | Adams   | Ultrasound Technologist  | invalid    | terminate  | 
ÏÏ§Ï| B         | 2              | Daves    | Jill    | Nurse                    | valid      | proceed    | 
ÏÏ§Ï| B         | 2              | Kane     | Peter   | Dentist                  | invalid    | terminate  | 
ÏÏ§Ï| A         | 1              | Salack   | Jeleel  | Cardiologist             | valid      | proceed    | 
ÏÏ§ | A         | 1              | Agbele   | Kehinde | Pathologist              | valid      | proceed    | 
Ï §Ï| A         | 1              | Daniel   | Lindert | Pulmonologist            | invalid    | terminate  | 
ÏÏ§Ï| B         | 2              | Kola     | Serifa  | Surgeon                  | valid      | proceed    | 
ÏÏ§Ï| C         | 3              | Malixa   | Jenifa  | Obstetrician             | invalid    | terminate  | 
ÏÏ§Ï| B         | 2              | Andy     | Lui     | Oncologist               | valid      | proceed    | 
ÏÏ§Ï| B         | 2              | Apalara  | Tijani  | Physician                | invalid    | terminate  | 
ÏÏ§Ï| A         | 1              | Sheick   | Caled   | Dental assistant         | invalid    | terminate  | 
ÏÏ§ | A         | 1              | Nurayhn  | Wale    | Podiatrist               | valid      | proceed    | 
 
Permission 
denied 
Permission 
granted 
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Figure 51:  Information about the users, domain and role 
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APPENDIX E 
Sample schemas for describing interoperability using a template presented in Figure 16. 
 
The following sample schemas are used. The schemas contain sharable and relevant information 
from the three domains as shown in Figure 16. 
 
StdNo SName  DOB 
 
StdNo Address  Gender  
 
StdNo SName FName Major CGPA Advisor  Workload 
 
StdNo SName FName GPA 
 
ProjNo Supervisor Report 
 
GradDate StdNo GradVenue 
Figure 52:  Sample schema for Domain A (University) 
In schema shown in Figure 52, relation Student has StdNo as the primary key and attributes 
Address and Gender to describe the address of the student as well as his gender. 
Relation Register has the Surname (SName), First Name (FName) and Date of Birth (DOB) as 
information for student (previously identified by StdNo) is registered. 
PostGradStd, Student, StdProjec t and Graduation contain specific information about student. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
    UGStudent 
  
Register 
  Register 
Student 
PostGradStd 
 
       StdProjec 
  Graduation  
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PatientID SName FName 
 
PatientID Sex  Address  
 
Emergency  
 
PatientID Major telephone 
 
MedicalAid HealthCondition Payment  
 
         Figure 53:  Sample schema for Domain B (Hospital) 
Also, in the sample schema presented in Figure 53, for Domain B (Hospital) relation Register 
has a “PatientID” as the primary key while SName, FName and DoB are attributes. Other 
relations include Patient, PatientNeed and PatDescription. 
Sample schema for Doamin C (Banking) is presented in Figure 54. Relation account has 
account- number as the primary key to attributes branchName and Balance. Brach, Customer 
and account-Holder are other relations with different attributes. 
 
branchName Balance  AccountNumber 
 
branchName Address  assets 
 
CustomerNumber Name Address  HomeBranch 
 
CustomerNumber  AccountNumber DoB 
 
Transaction-ID Account-ID Currency  Amount Balance  
 
Figure 54:   Sample schema for Domain C (Banking) 
At this juncture, appropriate meta-queries were issued on schemas designed for Domains A, B 
and C. To achieve interoperability across these schemas, various operations such as EXTRACT, 
UPDATE, MERGE, DELETE and SELECT can be carried out on them. 
In extracting information across the three domains,  a meta-query which is of the form : 
SELECT 
      Branch 
Account-Holder 
Transaction 
       Account  
       Customer  
Register 
 
Patient 
PatNeed 
PatDescription 
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From object Varnam, object Varname…. 
WHERE pge 
is considered. 
Hence, 
X.attr – X[A].attr-Y[B].attr-Z[C] 
Where A, B and C are domains and attr-X, attr-Y and attr-z are attributes in each of the 
domains. 
What has been achieved by the above statement is that all the attributes specified for all the 
domains A, B and C have been aggregated as unitary information. This implies that the 
aggregated information can now be used by any grid user. 
Also, 
SELECT * 
FROM 
WHERE Register.StdNo [A] .Patient[B].attr-Y. ACCOUNT-HOLDER [C] 
Here, the procedure “Extract” will bring all the information in relations “Register”, “Patient” 
and “account-holder” that belong to domains A, B and C. 
In order to merge different schemas from the three domains, the following meta-query language 
was issued. 
SELECT PostGradstd.StdNo , Graduaton.GradDate FROM Domain A 
 
UNION 
 
SELECT Register.PatientID , PatDescription.MedicalAid FROM Domain B 
UNION 
 
SELECT Account.AccountNumber, Account-Holder.CustomerNumber FROM 
Domain C 
From the foregoing, it has been established how interoperability is achievable when schemas are 
created across Domains. 
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APPENDIX F 
The means and the standard deviations of the experiments shown in Figures 29 and 30. 
Definitions: 
1. Let MSB denotes variance between the three domains considered 
2. Let MSW denotes variance within the three domains considered 
To evaluate both the means and standard deviation of the experiment shown in Figure 29, we 
construct hypothesis test based on the values obtained using ANOVA.  
HO: µ = µA = µB = µC, where A, B and C are domains considered. 
H1: At least one of the mean is different from the others. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 55: Showing values of 3.68 at F0.05 , 2, 15 
 
 
 
Rejection region 
F-Distribution 
0.95 
F0.05 , 2, 15 = 3.68 
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It is noted that there are currently the value of K = 3 domains, that is, Domains A, B , C. 
Therefore, DoFN  =  K- 1 = 3-1 =2. The sum of data for all the three domains denoted as N  = 
n1 + n2 + n3   = 6 + 6 + 6 = 18. 
Using the DoFD = N – K = 18 -3 = 15 and α = 0.05 (the Least Significant value).  
The critical value if F0.05 , 2, 3.68 (determined using F-Distribution table) 
 
There is need to find :  ̿  = mean of mean  =∑ /N , MSB = ∑     ̅    ̿  
2 /K-1  and  
MSW = ∑         i
2 /K-1   
 
Table 20: The values for average Turnaround time and the No of grid nodes for Domains A, B, C 
 
 
Parameters 
Determined 
 
 
No of grid 
nodes 
Turnaround time (T) 
(Domains A,B, C) 
 
Total Turnaround 
time for Domains 
A,B, C 
 
Average 
Turnaroun
d time for 
Domains 
A,B, C 
 
Domain A 
 
Domain B 
 
Domain C 
 10 12  = 30.77% 14 = 35.89% 13=33.33% 39 13 
20 7.0 =29.17% 8.0 =33.33% 9.0=37.50% 24 8 
30 4.2=23.33% 6.4=35.55% 7.4=41.11% 18 6 
40 3.8=25.33% 4.8=32.00% 6.4=42.67% 15 5 
50 3.1=25.83% 3.9=32.50% 5.0=41.67% 12 4 
60 1.4=23.33% 2.0 =33.33% 2.6=43.33% 6.0 2 
∑X  31.5 39.1 43.4   
 ̅ 5.25 6.51 7.233   
 2 11.879 14.73 10.59   
n 6 6 6   N = 
18 
  
 
The mean of mean denoted as   ̿ was determined as follows:  
  ̿ = 31.50 + 39.10 +43.40 /18 = 6.33, 
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The mean for each of the domains are evaluated as follows:  
 ̅Domain A = ∑X /n, = 31.5/ 6 = 5.25,  ̅Domain B = ∑X /n = 39.1/6 = 6.51 and  ̅Domain C = ∑X /n = 
43.40/6 = 7.233 
 2Domain A = 1/N ∑Xi
2 -   ̅2 = 236.65/6  - 5.252 = 11.879, while  2Domain B = 14.73 and  2Domain C is 
10.59 
Mean of Mean ;  ̿ = (31.5 + 39.1 + 43.4) / 18 = 6.33 
 
Also, from Table 20 shown, MSB = ∑     ̅    ̿  
2 /K-1 could be determined as follows: 
= 6(5.25 – 6.33)2 + 6(6.51 – 6.33)2 + 6(7.233 – 6.33)2 / 2 
= 6.042 
Also,  
MSW = ∑         i
2 /N-K   
= (6-1) 11.879 + (6-1) 14.73 + (6-1) 10.59 / 15 
= 12.399 
Therefore, the test statistics is F = MSB / MSW  = 6.042 / 12.339 = 0.4872 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 56: Showing F-Distribution table for 3.68 
 
 
 
 
 
3.68 
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Conclusion: 
Since F-Statistical table falls to the left of F-distribution (0.4872 < 3.68) therefore, we may 
conclude that there is no significance difference in the means of group of Domains A,B, and C. 
There is significantly no difference in the means even though the values of the grid nodes were 
varied independently across each of the domains and the corresponding values of the 
turnaround time.  
The graph of the No of grid nodes with their corresponding average turnaround time is 
presented in Figure 29 based on the values analysed in Table 20. 
 
Table 21: The values for average Turnaround time and the No of grid service requesters for Domains A, B, C 
 
 
Parameters 
Determined 
 
 
No of service 
requester  
Turnaround time (T) 
(Domains A,B, C) 
 
Total Turnaround 
time for Domains 
A,B, C 
 
Average 
Turnaroun
d time for 
Domains 
A,B, C 
 
Domain A 
 
Domain B 
 
Domain C 
 50 1.1 = 36.66% 1.4 = 46.66% 0.5 = 16.66% 3.0 1.0 
100 2.6 =30.95% 3.1 = 36.90% 2.7 = 32.14% 8.4 2.8 
200 2.8 = 29.17% 3.4 = 35.41% 3.4 = 35.42% 9.6 3.2 
300 3.0 = 29.41% 3.6 = 35.29% 3.6 = 35.29% 10.2 3.4 
400 3.6 = 30% 4.4 = 36.67% 4.0 = 33.33% 12.0 4.0 
      
∑X  13.1 15.9 14.2   
 ̅ 2.62 3.18 2.84   
 2 0.6896 0.9776 1.5464   
n 5 5 5   N = 15 
 
To find both the mean ( ̅) and the standard deviation ( 2 ) of experiment whose result is 
graphically presented in Figure 30, hypothesis was conducted based on the data obtained during 
experimentation. 
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As usual, the values of K, DoFN , N and DoFD are determined as : K = 3, DoFN = K – 1 = 3-1 
= 2 , N = n1 + n2 + n3  = 5 + 5 + 5 = 15 while DoFD = N – K = 15 – 3 = 12  and α = 0.05 
(the Least Significant value).  
For the experiment whose values appear in Table 21, the critical value F0.05 , 2, 3.89 (using F-
Distribution table) is determined. 
 2Domain A = 1/N ∑Xi
2 -   ̅2 = 37.77/5 – (2.62)2 = 0.68644,    2Domain B = 0.9776  and  
2
Domain C = 1.5464 
To calculate the Mean of Mean ( ̿  based on the values provided in the Table 21, therefore, 
 ̿ = 13.1 + 15.9 + 14.2 / 15 = 2.88 
Also, from Table 21 shown, MSB = ∑     ̅    ̿  
2 /K-1 could be determined as follows: 
= 5 (2.62 – 2.88 )2 + 5(3.18 – 2.88)2 + 5(2.84 – 2.88)2 /2 
= 0.796 / 2 = 0.398 
Also,  
MSW = ∑         i
2 /K-1  was obtained as follows: 
= (5-1) 0.6896 + (5-1) 0.9776 + (5-1) 1.5464/ 12 
= 12.8544 / 12 
= 1.0712 
Therefore, the statistics F =, MSB / MSW 
= 0.398 / 1.0712  
= 0.3715 
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Figure 57: Showing values of 3.89 at F0.05 , 2, 12 
 
Finally, since F-Statistical table falls to the left of F-Distribution (0.3715 < 3.89), it can therefore 
be concluded that there is no significance difference in the Mean of group of Domains A, B, C.  
Invariably, there is significantly no difference in the Mean even though; the values of No of grid 
service requesters were varied independently across each of the domains and the corresponding 
values of the average turnaround time. 
The final graph is presented in Figure 30 where the average turnaround time is plotted against 
the number of grid service requesters. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
F0.05 , 2, 12 = 3.89 
0.95 
F-Distribution  
 
Rejection region 
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APPENDIX G 
Sample source code for implementing access control  
 
 
import java.io.*; 
   import java.sql.*; 
 
   public class testResourceMngt 
    
   { 
      static BufferedReader inKb = new BufferedReader (new 
InputStreamReader (System.in)); 
      static Gridatabase db = new Gridatabase(); 
      static char choice = ' ';  
      static boolean loggedin =false; 
      
    
      public static void login() throws IOException,SQLException{ 
         String uname ="",pass =""; 
         System.out.println("\n\n      Grid User Login\n"); 
        System.out.println("    ===================\n"); 
         System.out.print("   Username:"); 
         uname =inKb.readLine(); 
         System.out.print("\n Password:"); 
         pass =inKb.readLine(); 
         System.out.println(); 
         db.isUser(uname,pass); 
       
         loggedin =true; 
      } 
     public static void admin() throws IOException,SQLException 
      { 
         do 
         {   
            System.out.println("        Administrative task"); 
            System.out.println(); 
           System.out.println("    1 - View all Domains and their roles"); 
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            System.out.println("    2 - View all Domains Users "); 
            System.out.println("    3 - View all Roles and services "); 
            System.out.println("    4 - View all info "); 
           System.out.println("    5 - Back to main menu "); 
          
            System.out.println("    Q - QUIT"); 
            System.out.println(" "); 
            System.out.print("        Your choice_ "); 
            choice =inKb.readLine().toUpperCase().charAt(0); 
         
            switch(choice) 
            { 
               case '1': 
                  { 
                     db.view_Domain_Roles(); 
                     break; 
                  } 
               case '2': 
                  { 
                 //Print all Domains Users  
                     db.view_Domain_user(); 
                     break; 
                 } 
               case '3': 
                  { 
                  //Print all Domains Users  
                     db.view_role_service(); 
                     break; 
                  } 
               case '4': 
                  { 
                  //Print all Domains Users  
                     db.displayAllUserQuery();                      
                     break; 
                  } 
               case '5': 
                  { 
                  //Print all Domains Users  
                     menu();                      
                     break; 
                  } 
             
            } 
         
         }while (choice!='Q'); 
      } 
      public static void user() throws IOException,SQLException 
      { 
       
       
         System.out.println("Current User details");   
 
 
 
 
Appendices  166 
 
 
 
         System.out.printf("USER  \t: %s\nDOMAIN\t: %s\nROLE  \t: 
%s\n",db.getName(),db.getDomain(),db.getRole());  
         
       
       
         do 
         { 
            System.out.println("    Access Resources and servives"); 
            System.out.println("================================="); 
          
            System.out.println("    1 - Show Accessible 
Resources/Services");   
            System.out.println("    2 - Show all services"); 
            System.out.println("    3 - Back to main menu "); 
          
            System.out.println("    Q - QUIT"); 
            System.out.println(" "); 
            System.out.print("        Your choice_ "); 
            choice = inKb.readLine().toUpperCase().charAt(0);; 
          
            switch(choice) 
            { 
               case '1': 
                  { 
                  //Show Accessible Resources/Services 
                     db.allowedService(); 
                     break; 
                  } 
               case '2': 
                  { 
                  //Show all services  
                     allserviceQuery(); 
                      
                     break; 
                  } 
               case '3': 
                  { 
                  //back to main menu 
                     menu();                      
                     break; 
                  }   
            } 
          
         }while (choice!='Q'); 
         inKb.close(); 
      } 
    
      public static void allserviceQuery()throws SQLException,IOException 
      { 
         
         String option ="", access =""; 
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        do 
         {       db.allService();    
            System.out.println("\n     Select service :"); 
            System.out.println("    Q - QUIT"); 
           System.out.println(" "); 
            System.out.print("        Your choice_ "); 
            option = inKb.readLine();  
            choice =option.toUpperCase().charAt(0); 
            access =db.verifyService(option); 
            if(!access.equals("Granted")){ 
               System.out.printf("Access %s !!\n You are not Authorised to 
use this service in your domain (%s)\n",access,db.getDomain());} 
            else{System.out.printf("Access %s !!\nProceed ...\n",access);} 
                                    
         } 
 while (choice != 'Q' );         
         inKb.close(); 
       //  DB.disconnect(); 
         System.out.println("Done");      
      } 
       
       
      public static void menu()throws SQLException,IOException 
      { 
         System.out.println(); 
         System.out.println("CENTRAL SERVICES AND MONITORING 
UNIT\n_____________________________________"); 
         System.out.println(); 
         do 
         {          
            System.out.println("        WELCOME TO GRID COMPUTING -
\n(Resource Management) "); 
            System.out.println("Login as: \n \t 1. Admin \n \t 2. User"); 
            System.out.println("    pQ - QUIT"); 
            System.out.println(" "); 
           System.out.print("        Your choice_ "); 
            choice = inKb.readLine().toUpperCase().charAt(0); 
            switch(choice) 
            { 
               case '1': 
                  { 
                     if(!loggedin) 
                        login();//Admin 
                     admin(); 
                     break; 
                  } 
               case '2': 
                  { 
                     if(!loggedin) 
                        login(); // user 
                     user(); 
 
 
 
 
Appendices  168 
 
 
 
                     break; 
                  } 
            } 
         } 
         while (choice != 'Q' );     
       
         inKb.close(); 
       //  DB.disconnect(); 
         System.out.println("Done");   
      } 
       
       
      public static void main (String[] args) throws 
SQLException,IOException 
      { 
       
       //  NewsPaper91 DB = new NewsPaper91(); 
         menu(); 
         db.disconnect(); 
      }// main 
    
   }//class 
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